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Katherine’s Questionable Quest 
for Love and Happiness
BO C. KLINTBERG
SCENE I.
The Floridian Liti-Gator
 CHRISTIANUS. Katherine! There you are!
2 KATHERINE. Chris! At last! It’s so nice to see 
you!
3 CHRISTIANUS. And it’s very nice to see you too, 
my dear!
4 KATHERINE. Is it two years?
5 CHRISTIANUS. No, it’s almost three years since 
I saw you in Miami!
Copyright © 2007–2008 Bo C. Klintberg. All rights reserved. 
Bo C. Klintberg (2008), Katherine’s Questionable Quest for Love 
and Happiness. Philosophical Plays, VOL. 1, NO. 1 (JAN. 2008): –98.  
CHARACTERS:
Christianus, a satisfactionist
Katherine, a lawyer
The scene throughout is in a
London pizzeria; it’s late afternoon,
Wednesday, March 21, 2007.
6 KATHERINE. Really?
7 CHRISTIANUS. Yes. Time does fly, doesn’t it? 
8 KATHERINE. It sure does!
9 CHRISTIANUS. Have you been here long?
0 KATHERINE. No. I just came myself. 
 CHRISTIANUS. Great!  And you’re not too mad 
at me for being a little late?
2 KATHERINE. No, of course not. I was late my-
self.
3 CHRISTIANUS. Problems?
4 KATHERINE. Well, not any real flight prob-
lems, as such. I mean, we had some ex-
tra security procedures in Miami before 
we boarded, so we got a late start. But I 
don’t mind that, if it really improves the 
safety. 
5 CHRISTIANUS. Yes. In these days of global ter-
rorism and suicide bombings one cannot 
get too much security. 
6 KATHERINE. Exactly. And then when we were 
approaching Heathrow this morning, we 
were already a little off schedule, so we 
couldn’t land immediately but had to 
circle for a while. So we got even more 
delayed. But safety-wise, there were no 
problems; the flight just ended up being 
very late.
2 Katherine’s Questionable Quest
7 CHRISTIANUS. Well, if that’s all you have, then 
it doesn’t sound so bad, especially for a 
transantlantic flight. But that isn’t all, is 
it?
8 KATHERINE. Let me put it like this, Chris: 
apart from the delays, everything went 
quite smoothly all the way from Miami 
to the Heathrow baggage claim area.
9 CHRISTIANUS. Uh-oh.
20 KATHERINE. Yes. They lost my luggage! Can 
you believe it?
2 CHRISTIANUS. Oh dear! That’s terrible! 
22 KATHERINE. So I had to spend hours at Heath-
row trying to deal with it.
23 CHRISTIANUS. That’s outrageous!
24 KATHERINE. Yes. And it gets even worse: I had 
some very important documents in my 
luggage.
25 CHRISTIANUS. But don’t you think that the 
airline will find your things? 
26 KATHERINE. Maybe. But I doubt it.
27 CHRISTIANUS. Hey! Cheer up, Katherine! I 
mean, even if they don’t find your things, 
I am sure you can handle it. You are not 
exactly afraid of ‘expressing yourself ’ in 
matters of civil and corporate law. After 
all, you are known as ‘The Floridian Liti-
3The Floridian Liti-Gator
Gator’!
28 KATHERINE. Sure. But it’s still a lot of work to 
litigate.
29 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, yes, of course. No doubt.
30 KATHERINE. And there is more to the story.
3 CHRISTIANUS. More?
32 KATHERINE. Yes. I left out some details that 
really complicate things.
33 CHRISTIANUS. Oh, no!
34 KATHERINE. Oh, yes! Remember I said that 
I had some very important documents 
with me?
35 CHRISTIANUS. Naturally.
36 KATHERINE. Well, those documents are not 
4
1:27, Floridian Liti-Gator: There are 
many colourful actors on the Florida 
scene, including some very bright liti-
gation lawyers, some very hard-hitting 
American football players such as the 
University of Florida Gators [http://
www.gatorzone.com], and, says BBC 
(2006), even some attacking alligators. 
Katherine’s character is presumably 
an amalgamation of various aspects of 
these.
 BBC (2006), ‘The threat from Flor-
ida’s alligators’. BBC NEWS [http://news.
bbc.co.uk], 15 May 2006, 15:39 GMT. 
1:28, litigate: According to Burton 
(1985, p. 317), the verb litigate may 
mean: ‘altercate, appeal to the law, assert 
in court, bring action against, bring an 
action, bring suit, bring to the bar, bring 
to trial, carry on a lawsuit, contend, 
contest in court, contest in law, go into 
litigation, institute legal proceedings, 
litigare, prefer a claim, press in court, 
pursue in court, seek legal redress, start 
a lawsuit, start an action, sue, take to 
court, urge in court’. 
 WILLIAM C. BURTON (1985), Legal The-
saurus. Complete and unabridged. New 
York: Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc., 
and London: Collier Macmillan Pub-
lishers. 
1:38, The Scream: Edvard Munch’s 
(1863–1944) famous The Scream (Norw. 
Skrik) exists, according to Bischoff (997, 
p. 53), in more than fifty versions. The 
version that Bischoff calls ‘the main one’ 
Katherine’s Questionable Quest
only very important — they are com-
pletely irreplaceable. So even if I take the 
airline to court and manage to get some 
recompense in dollars and cents, it’s still 
not good enough. If I can’t get my lug-
gage back with all those original docu-
ments, I will be in a hell of a lot of trou-
ble. Personal trouble.
37 CHRISTIANUS. I am very sorry to hear that, 
Katherine.
38 KATHERINE. Yes, it’s a nightmare! When I real-
ized that I actually had lost my luggage, I 
felt like I was in The Scream.
39 CHRISTIANUS. You mean, Munch’s scream? 
40 KATHERINE. Yes, Munch’s interminable scream. 
5
(in oil, tempera, and pastel) was paint-
ed in 1893 and measures 91 x 73 cm 
(National Gallery, Oslo). See Bischoff 
(1997, p. 52) for a nice colour reproduc-
tion. Another version (a lithography) 
was made in 1895 and is reproduced in 
Gombrich (1953, p. 423).
 ULRICH BISCHOFF (1997), Edvard 
Munch. Köln: Benedikt Taschen Verlag. 
 E. H. GOMBRICH (1953), Kunstens His-
torie. With 370 illustrations. Copenha-
gen: Steen Hasselbalchs Forlag. Original 
edition (1950): The Story of Art. London: 
Phaidon Press.
1:40, Munch’s interminable scream: 
Gombrich (1953, pp. 424) asserts that 
we will never know what lies behind 
Munch’s scream. And yet, Katherine 
seems to be pretty sure that Munch’s 
scream is interminable. But how can 
she know that? One explanation may be 
that Katherine did not take Gombrich’s 
proposition very seriously. So although 
she presumably did inspect the painting 
visually in order to know more about 
it, she may also have read Munch’s own 
description of the scream in his 1892 di-
ary: ‘I was walking down the road with 
two friends — the sun went down — I 
felt like a gust of melancholy. The sky 
suddenly became red like blood — I 
stopped, leaned against the fence, dead 
tired — saw the flaming skies as blood 
and sword — the bluish-black fjord and 
town — My friends continued to walk 
— I stood there trembling of anxiety — 
and I felt like a big interminable scream 
The Floridian Liti-Gator
But it was also my scream, mixed togeth-
er, somehow.
4 CHRISTIANUS. So perhaps I shouldn’t say, then, 
‘Welcome back to London’, after that in-
terminable terminal event of yours?
42 KATHERINE. Don’t worry, Chris: I am very hap-
py being back in London, even though 
Heathrow certainly was a much too ex-
pressionistic experience for my taste. But 
I am much better now: more together, 
more centred. Actually, I almost feel like 
I am sitting in Monet’s boat when I am 
here with you.
43 CHRISTIANUS. Ah! Your favourite Manet paint-
ing!
44 KATHERINE. Yes! You remembered!
45 CHRISTIANUS. Of course! Who can forget that 
6
through nature’ (Bischoff 1997, p. 53; 
my translation from the Norwegian).
1:43, favourite Manet painting: Chris-
tianus probably refers to Manet’s 1874 
painting Monet working in his boat 
(Neue Pinakothek, Munich). See Go-
mbrich (1953, p. 389) for a beautiful 
colour reproduction.
1:51, mostly kapha: Ayurveda is a very 
elaborate system of ancient Indian med-
ical teachings. One of its cornerstones 
is the tridosha doctrine, which to some 
extent resembles the Hippocratic (ca. 
460–370 B.C.) doctrine of the four hu-
mours (as presented in On the Nature 
of Man) and the Galenic (ca. 129–210 
A.D.) system that continued on that 
path (Lindberg 1992, pp. 125–126). 
The ayurvedic tridosha system teaches 
that there are three (Skt. tri) humours 
(doshas). The three doshas are: phlegm 
(kapha or shleshman), wind (vaata), and 
choler or bile (pitta) (Wujastyk 2003, 
pp. xvii–xviii). These govern ‘all bio-
logical, psychological and physiopatho-
logical functions of the body and mind’ 
(Heinrich, Barnes, Gibbons, and Wil-
liamson 2004, p. 176). As Vasant Lad 
remarks, ‘[t]he individual constitution 
determines disease-proneness’ (1984, p. 
Katherine’s Questionable Quest
light, that tranquillity, that boat?
46 KATHERINE. Yes. It’s a very serene scene.
47 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, and it’s very satisfying for 
the heart.
48 KATHERINE. Very!
49 CHRISTIANUS. But it’s not very satisfying for 
the stomach. So perhaps we can have a 
look at the menu now? 
50 KATHERINE. Sure, but I am not all that hun-
gry.
5 CHRISTIANUS. Ah, yes. You are mostly kapha, 
aren’t you?
52 KATHERINE. Yes, I think that’s what my ay-
urvedic doctor says.
53 CHRISTIANUS. I thought so. As for myself, I 
am predominantly pitta. So I simply 
7
37). The idea is that a person whose con-
stitution is, say, predominantly kapha, 
may experience certain diseases that are 
typical for the kapha constitution, for 
example ‘repeated attacks of tonsillitis, 
sinusitis, bronchitis and congestion in 
the lungs’ (1984, p. 38).
 MICHAEL HEINRICH, JOANNE BARNES, 
SIMON GIBBONS, and ELIZABETH M. WIL-
LIAMSON (2004), Fundamentals of Phar-
macognosy and Phytotherapy. Foreword 
by A. Douglas Kinghorn. Epilogue by J. 
David Phillipson. Edinburgh and New 
York: Churchill Livingstone. 
 VASANT LAD (1984), The Science of 
Self-Healing: A Practical Guide. Illus-
trated by Angela Werneke. Santa Fe, NM: 
Lotus Press. 
 DAVID C. LINDBERG (1992), The Begin-
nings of Western Science: The European 
Scientific Tradition in Philosophical, Re-
ligious, and Institutional Context, 600 B.C. 
to A.D. 1450. Chicago and London: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press. 
 DOMINIK WUJASTYK (2003), The Roots 
of Ayurveda: Selections from Sanskrit 
Medical Writings. Harmondsworth, 
Middlesex: Penguin Classic.
1:53, predominantly pitta: Chris-
tianus’s statement may be compared to 
Lad’s description of a typical pitta in-
The Floridian Liti-Gator
must have something right now. I am 
starving!
54 KATHERINE. OK. What would you like?
55 CHRISTIANUS. Let’s see . . . what do you think 
about one of these Venetian Blinds?
56 KATHERINE. Well, it sounds somewhat dan-
gerous. I am not sure that my ophthal-
mologist would approve of it, since my 
vision already is somewhat impaired. 
Maybe the Romantic Romana is safer?
57 CHRISTIANUS. Could be, at least from a purely 
ophthalmic viewpoint. And it certainly 
sounds less eruptive than the Vesuvian 
Volcano, too. Does the Romana come 
with extra cheese, you think?
58 KATHERINE. They say it does; it’s listed on the 
first page of the menu.
59 CHRISTIANUS. Ah, yes — there it is! But what 
would your psychiatrist say about order-
ing such a romantic preparation, consid-
ering your most recent traumatic divorce 
and your otherwise so tumultuous love 
life? Isn’t he a Freudian?
8
dividual: ‘Pittas have a strong appetite, 
strong metabolism, and strong diges-
tion’ (1998, p. 22).
 VASANT D. LAD (1998), The Complete 
Book of Ayurvedic Home Remedies. Illus-
trations by Vasant D. Lad. New York: 
Three Rivers Press.
1:56, impaired: Note that Katherine 
uses the word ‘impaired’ here. Accord-
ing to Bradford (1999, p. 9), there is a 
difference between visual impairment (or 
visual acuity impairment) and visual dis-
ability: while visual impairment (20/80, 
20/200, etc.) points to a condition of 
Katherine’s Questionable Quest
60 KATHERINE. Sure he is. But I don’t care what 
he says; he’s more traumatic and tumul-
tuous than I am! 
6 CHRISTIANUS. Fair enough. It’s your life.
62 KATHERINE. It certainly is. So should we share 
a Romana, then?
63 CHRISTIANUS. Maybe. How big is it?
64 KATHERINE. Well, they say it’s for four peo-
ple.
65 CHRISTIANUS. Hmmm. I feel like three people 
myself. How about you?
66 KATHERINE. I normally do have a reptilian ap-
petite. But today I’ll settle for less. So if 
you could feel more like two people in-
stead of three, then we may have a deal. 
What do you say? 
67 CHRISTIANUS. OK, sounds great! Let’s order. 
Waiter!
9
the eyes, visual disability (moderate low 
vision, severe low vision, etc.) points to 
a condition of the individual. So ‘[t]wo 
individuals with the same visual impair-
ment measured on a Snellen eye chart 
may show very different levels of func-
tional disability’ (1999, p. 9). 
 CYNTHIA A. BRADFORD (1999), Basic 
Ophthalmology for Medical Students and 
Primary Care Residents. Seventh edition. 
San Francisco, CA: American Academy 
of Ophthalmology.
The Floridian Liti-Gator
SCENE II.
On Battles, Wars, and Meaning
 CHRISTIANUS. So what takes you to London, 
Katherine? 
2 KATHERINE. British Airways, as usual.
3 CHRISTIANUS. Of course! I certainly do re-
member that you have some affinity for 
their evening flights and their comfy-cosy 
little six-feet-plus beds. But I mean, what 
are you doing here? Isn’t the suing market 
better on the other side of the Atlantic?
4 KATHERINE. Sure it’s better. I am swamped!
5 CHRISTIANUS. Sounds very Floridian, indeed.
6 KATHERINE. Yes. So, I’m not here on busi-
ness.
11:3, comfy-cosy: Christianus presum-
ably uses this construction here not just 
to be more concise and economical (a 
less concise way of expressing himself 
might have been, for example, ‘comfy 
and cosy’). One reason could be that 
he wants to add a certain rhythm to the 
sentence that otherwise would not have 
been there; and maybe he feels that a 
hendiadys construction would not cre-
ate, in the present case, the desired ‘pho-
naesthetic effect’ that it is sometimes 
used for (McArthur 1992, p. 468). An-
other reason could be that he wants to 
avoid hendiadys-related interpretation 
issues, such as the one in which Hahn 
claims that hendiadys is a ‘misnomer’ in 
regards to Virgil, and that when Virgil 
wrote as if his ideas were two, ‘he really 
did have two’ (Preminger, Warnke, and 
Hardison, Jr. 1965, p. 344; my empha-
sis).
 TOM MCARTHUR, ed. (1992), The Ox-
ford Companion to the English Language. 
Oxford and New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
 ALEX PREMINGER, FRANK J. WARNKE, and 
O. B. HARDISON, JR. (1965), Encyclopedia of 
Poetry and Poetics. Princeton, NJ: Princ-
eton University Press.
7 CHRISTIANUS. But it’s not pleasure either, is 
it?
8 KATHERINE. No, it’s more an attempt to get 
away, to stay sane.
9 CHRISTIANUS. Time out?
0 KATHERINE. Definitely.
 CHRISTIANUS. Running out of steam?
2 KATHERINE. Sort of.
3 CHRISTIANUS. Anything you want to share?
4 KATHERINE. Well, there are so many things 
that are worrisome. 
5 CHRISTIANUS. Like what?
6 KATHERINE. Well, just take all that fighting 
that is still going on in Iraq. Just yester-
day they hanged Saddam’s old VP, on the 
anniversary of the U.S.-led invasion.
11
11:3, six-feet-plus beds: British Airways 
[http://www.britishairways.com] has of-
fered, and may still offer, their First Class 
customers ‘ergonomically designed 6ft 
6” beds’ for ‘[u]nparalleled comfort and 
privacy’ on their Boeing 747 jets flying 
from Miami to London. BA seemingly 
offered this service both on their late af-
ternoon flights (BA0206) and on their 
evening flights (BA0208).
11:16, hanged: Mariam Karouny re-
ports: ‘Saddam Hussein’s former vice 
president was hanged for crimes against 
humanity early on Tuesday, the fourth 
anniversary of the U.S.-led invasion that 
toppled Saddam Hussein from power’ 
(2007).
 MARIAM KAROUNY (2007), ‘Saddam 
VP hanged on 4th anniversary of inva-
sion’. Reuters [http://www.reuters.com], 
Tuesday, 20 March 2007, 4:38 EDT.
On Battles, Wars, and Meaning
7 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, I heard about that. And it’s 
four years now since it all started, isn’t 
it?
8 KATHERINE. Yes — and one day. And Bush 
is still pursuing that war, even though 
he doesn’t have the full support of the 
American people.
9 CHRISTIANUS. But that’s hardly any news, is 
it?
20 KATHERINE. No. But it’s still problematic. And 
the problem is not just that it fits badly 
with democratic principles.
2 CHRISTIANUS. How do you mean?
22 KATHERINE. Well, the bigger issue is that we 
don’t know what the war is for anymore. 
What’s the goal of all this fighting, now 
that both Saddam and his VP are perma-
nently done away with?
23 CHRISTIANUS. But isn’t the official story that 
the troops are there to stabilize the Iraqi 
region, until it cools down? Or at least 
until the Iraqis are able to handle their 
security issues themselves?
12
11:18, full support: Adam Tanner 
writes: ‘Polls show most Americans now 
oppose the war in Iraq’ (2007).
 ADAM TANNER (2007), ‘More than 
100 arrested in Iraq protests’. Reuters 
[http://www.reuters.com], Tuesday, 20 
March 2007, 9:06 EDT.
11:27, American scholars: Christianus 
may here refer to scholars such as Gho-
barah, Huth, and Russett who in one 
paper conclude that it is ‘not very sur-
prising’ that civil wars kill and maim 
people (2003, p. 189). Some of their 
other brilliant observations are: ‘[c]ivil 
Katherine’s Questionable Quest
24 KATHERINE. Sure. But how can we truly be-
lieve that story? Anyone with an IQ of 
20 or more must realize that it is more 
or less impossible to achieve any stability 
in that region under the present circum-
stances. It’s a civil war, and the citizens 
are practically willing to do just about 
anything, including blowing themselves 
up, to demonstrate their discontent and 
determination. 
25 CHRISTIANUS. So it’s a war that cannot be won 
by either the U.S.-led troops or by the 
Iraqi government, you say? 
26 KATHERINE. Yes, that’s approximately my po-
sition. They may of course win an in-
dividual battle or two; but not the war 
itself.
27 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, civil wars are always diffi-
cult — even according to some Ameri-
can scholars.
28 KATHERINE. Yes, especially for governments: 
for they are no longer in control!
29 CHRISTIANUS. Indeed! But I don’t understand 
13
wars continue to kill people indirectly, 
well after the shooting stops’ (p. 189), 
and ‘civil wars greatly raise the subse-
quent risk of death and disability from 
many infectious diseases, including ma-
laria, tuberculosis, and other infectious 
respiratory diseases’ (p. 200).
 HAZEM ADAM GHOBARAH, PAUL HUTH, 
and BRUCE RUSSETT (2003), ‘Civil Wars 
Kill and Maim People—Long After the 
Shooting Stops’ in American Political 
Science Review, vol. 97, no. 2, pp. 189–
202.
On Battles, Wars, and Meaning
what all of this has to do with you, per-
sonally? Where’s the connection? 
30 KATHERINE. Well, I am in the midst of an on-
going war myself, a war that also cannot 
be won.
3 CHRISTIANUS. A war?
32 KATHERINE. Well, I am a lawyer, right? And I 
am drawn into new battles, all the time.
33 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, but isn’t that what lawyers 
like yourself are supposed to be doing?
34 KATHERINE. Sure. And that’s my problem: I 
am not satisfied with what I am doing all 
day long. 
35 CHRISTIANUS. How come?
36 KATHERINE. Well, even though I actually do 
manage to win many of those individual 
cases that I take on, I don’t feel that I am 
accomplishing anything in the big picture 
by winning them.
37 CHRISTIANUS. But doesn’t it feel good to fight 
all that Miami vice?
38 KATHERINE. Sure, sometimes. But that feeling 
is not enough. My point is that vice is 
always going to be there, with or without 
me. In other words, whatever I do, I can 
never permanently put an end to it any-
way. So it feels meaningless to continue. 
It’s a war that I cannot win, regardless of 
how hard I try. It’s meaningless.
14 Katherine’s Questionable Quest
SCENE III.
Maximum Happiness, 
Minimum Unhappiness
 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, I think that is a very inter-
esting point. I can actually relate to your 
situation quite well.
2 KATHERINE. You can?
3 CHRISTIANUS. Yes.  I had similar thoughts my-
self, years ago.
4 KATHERINE. Really?
5 CHRISTIANUS. Really. 
6 KATHERINE. And?
7 CHRISTIANUS. And I had to do some serious 
soul-searching to get back my motiva-
tion. 
8 KATHERINE. How did it go?
9 CHRISTIANUS. It went very well. I concluded 
that I couldn’t get really satisfied unless I 
changed certain things about myself.
0 KATHERINE. What things?
 CHRISTIANUS. Well, one thing was that I had 
to learn how to trust myself.
2 KATHERINE. Trust yourself?
3 CHRISTIANUS. Yes. I realized that I could get all 
my questions answered, even the big and 
perennial ones, if only I wanted them an-
swered. But I didn’t have the guts to start 
facing those questions, partly because I 
was trusting my own mind too much. So 
I had to work on that.
4 KATHERINE. So it’s all about trusting oneself?
5 CHRISTIANUS. Well, it’s one piece of the puz-
zle.
6 KATHERINE. And how does this relate to me?
7 CHRISTIANUS. It’s quite straightforward: you, 
too, can get all questions answered, in-
cluding the big ones, if you only want 
them answered.
8 KATHERINE. I can?
9 CHRISTIANUS. Yes. But your wicked little mind 
most probably tries to convince you that 
it is no idea even to start looking for any 
answers: ‘Why waste time trying to find 
answers to perennial problems that sim-
ply cannot be answered?’
20 KATHERINE. Yes, I have heard similar thoughts 
within me.
2 CHRISTIANUS. But having heard such thoughts 
within you is, of course, no guarantee 
for that the big questions cannot be an-
swered?
22 KATHERINE. Of course not.
16 Katherine’s Questionable Quest
23 CHRISTIANUS. And you do agree that there are 
big questions to be answered?
24 KATHERINE. Yes.
25 CHRISTIANUS. So you need to know the an-
swers.
26 KATHERINE. Yes.
27 CHRISTIANUS. In fact, perhaps you already, on 
some level, know them?
28 KATHERINE. No, I don’t. 
29 CHRISTIANUS. Well, you have to be perfectly 
honest with yourself. Then you may know 
them.
30 KATHERINE. But I am honest, Chris! I really 
don’t know them! I just think my life 
is more or less meaningless right now. 
That’s all I know!
3 CHRISTIANUS. Well, maybe you don’t know 
those answers as you know the name of 
your cat, or as you know the taste of a 
freshly made pizza? 
32 KATHERINE. I am not sure I follow.
33 CHRISTIANUS. All right. Let’s take a break. It 
is a very demanding subject matter. And 
I am so hungry right now that I have a 
hard time concentrating anyway.
34 KATHERINE. Why don’t you take one of these 
crispy breadsticks while we’re waiting for 
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the waiter to appear?
35 CHRISTIANUS. Excellent idea! Thank you!
36 KATHERINE. I am sure that they are making 
our pizza as we speak. 
37 CHRISTIANUS. I hope you’re right!
38 KATHERINE. Amazing! You really are a typical 
pitta, getting all moody and jittery like 
that! I wish I had your metabolism! I am 
putting on weight all the time! 
39 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, your kapha constitution is 
quite accentuated. That makes it hard for 
you to be really slim.
40 KATHERINE. It certainly does!
4 CHRISTIANUS. And being overweight also 
might have a negative impact on the 
length of your life, at least if we are to be-
lieve some public health statistics. But if 
it’s any consolation, a pitta constitution 
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111:39, kapha constitution: Chris-
tianus’s observation may be inspired 
by Vasant Lad’s descriptions of a typi-
cal kapha individual: ‘Individuals with 
a kapha body type have a steady appe-
tite and thirst, though digestion is slow. 
They can comfortably skip a meal or 
work without food, while it is difficult 
for a pitta person to concentrate without 
eating’ (1998, p. 25); and: ‘With their 
larger frames and constitutions domi-
nated by the water and earth elements, 
kaphas tend to gain weight and have dif-
ficulty taking it off’ (1998, p. 25).
111:43, Benthamian: Jeremy Bentham 
(1748–1832), British social reformer, 
based his version of utilitarianism on the 
‘principle of utility’, a decision-criterion 
that accepts an action if it may result in 
a maximization of happiness. Bentham 
was ‘much less concerned with the more 
abstract and metaphysical questions in-
volved’ (Dye 1972, p. 281), and his idea 
of happiness is to be understood very 
concretely by the presence of pleasure 
and the absence of pain and suffering in 
individuals (Postema 2001, p. 138). Says 
Bentham (1988, p. 28): ‘the only con-
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like mine can be quite diabolical too: it 
is not entirely without metabolical com-
plications either.
42 KATHERINE. You’re a good friend, Chris. But I 
think that you may have misunderstood 
me. My motive for wanting to be slim 
is not primarily to be ‘healthy’, or to 
squeeze out some maximum number of 
years from this body; nor is to ‘adhere’ 
to some public health statistics. Rather, 
my main concern is simply to be able to 
experience happiness; or, if that’s not pos-
sible, at least avoiding too much unhap-
piness.
43 CHRISTIANUS. You sound very Benthamian.
44 KATHERINE. Well, it’s just that I like his 
straightforward style.
45 CHRISTIANUS. Many do. In fact, even those 
who aren’t lawyers may quite easily relate 
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sequences that men are at all interested 
in, what are they but pain and pleasure?’ 
Bentham’s maximization, according to 
Postema (2001, p. 139), is not limited 
in scope only to all individual human 
beings, but includes all sentient, suffer-
ing beings. 
 JEREMY BENTHAM (1988), A Fragment 
on Government. The New Authorita-
tive Edition by J. H. Burns and H. L. 
A. Hart with an Introduction by Ross 
Harrison. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
 JAMES W. DYE (1972), ‘Bentham, Jer-
emy’ in Paul Edwards, ed., The Encyclo-
pedia of Philosophy. Vol. 1. New York: 
Macmillan Publishing Co. and The Free 
Press; London: Collier Macmillan Pub-
lishers, pp. 280–285.
 GERALD J. POSTEMA (2001), ‘Ben-
tham, Jeremy’ in Lawrence C. Becker 
and Charlotte B. Becker, eds., Routledge 
Encyclopedia of Ethics. Second edition. 
New York and London: Routledge, pp. 
137–141.
111:45, those who aren’t lawyers: 
Christianus may here refer to a passage 
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to his utility talk, even if they, just like 
the lawyers, don’t always walk it. 
46 KATHERINE. Yes.
47 CHRISTIANUS. But let’s go back to you now, 
Katherine. You just said that you want to 
experience happiness and avoid unhap-
piness. What do you mean by that?
48 KATHERINE. It’s quite simple: I have no friends, 
I have no lovers, and I am miserable. So I 
want friends and lovers. Then I’ll be hap-
py, or at least less miserable. How’s that?
49 CHRISTIANUS. It’s a start. So your idea is that 
losing weight will make it easier for you 
to find new friends and lovers?
50 KATHERINE. Yes, that’s the plan. I am just too 
fat right now. I can see it in the mirror, 
and I can see it in people’s eyes.
5 CHRISTIANUS. Maybe you are right. At least 
in the modern Western world, fat people 
are commonly perceived as rather unat-
tractive, and therefore less appreciated, 
and perhaps particularly so by prospec-
tive lovers.
52 KATHERINE. Yes.
20
in which Jeremy Bentham says, ‘and 
pain and pleasure at least, are words 
which a man has no need, we may hope, 
to go to a Lawyer to know the meaning 
of ’ (1988, p. 28).
111:45, walk it: Christianus presumably 
wants to say that ‘walking the utility 
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53 CHRISTIANUS. So we may say that your kapha 
constitution really does affect your daily 
life, including your love life, in a very di-
rect way.
54 KATHERINE. Yes.
55 CHRISTIANUS. And it certainly doesn’t make 
you less gloomy about it, does it?
56 KATHERINE. No, it doesn’t.
21
talk’ is different from just talking about 
it. Maybe he also wants to say that there 
is something about the utility talk that 
makes it harder to walk it?
111:55, make you less gloomy: Chris-
tianus probably tries to say that having a 
kapha constitution may make Katherine 
more prone to suffer from depression.
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SCENE IV.
Katherine’s Real Problem
 CHRISTIANUS. So you need to take charge of 
the situation, Katherine! And you need 
to identify your real problem!
2 KATHERINE. My real problem?
3 CHRISTIANUS. Well, although your bodily 
constitution, your weight, and your lack 
of friends and lovers certainly may seem 
to be causes of unhappiness for you, your 
real problem is of a different nature.
4 KATHERINE. It is?
5 CHRISTIANUS. Yes. But you are, of course, not 
the only one in the universe who has ever 
focused on weight-loss and amore. Many 
souls already have been, and surely also 
will be, engaged in similar questionable 
quests.
6 KATHERINE. What do you mean?
7 CHRISTIANUS. Well, many people are very con-
1v:7, the camel: The story of the camel 
and the noodle that Christianus men-
tions is presumably not identical with 
the parable mentioned in Matthew 
19:23–26, where Jesus talks about the 
camel and the needle. However, Jesus’s 
parable might still be of interest to those 
readers who are interested in topics such 
as death and immortality. For example, 
Metzger and Murphy seem to conclude 
that Jesus’s point is that eternal life will 
be found not ‘through a ritual that wealth 
makes possible’, but through ‘utter de-
pendence on God’ (1991, p. 28NT). Un-
cerned about their physical appearance 
and their potential sex appeal. And they 
keep on searching for some simple happi-
ness and pleasure and try to stay clear of 
as much unhappiness as they can. Mean-
while, they many times leave the deeper 
‘existential’ issues in the closet. It actually 
reminds me of the story about the camel 
and the noodle.
8 KATHERINE. Maybe we can return to the cam-
el story some other time. What’s my so-
called ‘real’ problem? 
9 CHRISTIANUS. Your real problem is that you 
are going to die. And I think that you 
may have realized that, at least on some 
level. 
0 KATHERINE. So?
 CHRISTIANUS. What do you mean? Doesn’t 
that bother you?
2 KATHERINE. No.
3 CHRISTIANUS. Why not?
4 KATHERINE. It’s only natural to die.
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fortunately, Metzger and Murphy do not 
explain why such ritualistic work — es-
pecially in cases where one uses substan-
tial portions of one’s wealth — wouldn’t 
count as (real, substantial) service unto 
God, or why it wouldn’t count as being 
(utterly) dependent on God.
 BRUCE M. METZGER and ROLAND E. 
MURPHY, eds. (1991), The New Oxford 
Annotated Bible with the Apocryphal/
Deuterocanonical Books. New Revised 
Standard Version. New York: Oxford 
University Press.
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5 CHRISTIANUS. It is also natural to sometimes 
get a toothache; but that doesn’t mean 
that we are not afraid of it, does it?
6 KATHERINE. Well, no.
7 CHRISTIANUS. And while toothaches may or 
may not come, death doesn’t normally 
not show up, does it?
8 KATHERINE. No.
9 CHRISTIANUS. And while toothaches normal-
ly can be fixed if one only has enough 
money to pay the dentist — or at least 
the nerve to go to him even though one 
doesn’t have enough money to pay him 
afterwards — death cannot be fixed by 
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1v:21, pragmatic: According to Morris 
(1973, pp. 1028–1029), the adjective 
‘pragmatic’ may mean different things: 
(1) ‘Dealing with facts or actual occur-
rences’, or ‘[a]ctive rather than contem-
plative’; (2) ‘Pertaining to the study of 
events and historical phenomena with 
emphasis on their practical outcome’; 
(3) ‘Of or pertaining to pragmatism’. 
One may, perhaps, also note that Chris-
tianus has used the word ‘pragmatic’ and 
not the word ‘pragmatical’. Morris does 
not indicate any difference in meaning 
between these words; but H. W. Fowler 
(1858–1933) says: ‘In the diplomatic, 
historical, and philosophical senses, the 
-ic form is usual. In the general sense of 
officious or opinionated, -ical is com-
moner’ (1965, p. 469).
 H. W. FOWLER (1965), A Dictionary 
of Modern English Usage. Second Edi-
tion. Revised by Sir Ernest Gowers. Ox-
ford and New York: Oxford University 
Press.
 WILLIAM MORRIS, ed. (1973), The 
American Heritage Dictionary of the 
English Language. New York: American 
Heritage Publishing Co. and Houghton 
Mifflin Company.
1v:21, pragmatic American: One may, 
of course, be a pragmatic American in 
different ways, including when one 
takes the word ‘pragmatic’ to point to 
the philosophical school of pragmatism. 
Famous American philosophers such as 
Charles Saunders Peirce (1839–1914), 
William James (1842–1910), and John 
Dewey (1859–1952) did not have an 
identical pragmatist philosophy; how-
ever, they all shared the idea, roughly, 
that consequences or effects of actions 
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anyone, regardless of how much money 
one has.
20 KATHERINE. So?
2 CHRISTIANUS. So, being the pragmatic Ameri-
can you are, wouldn’t you then agree that, 
empirically and ‘scientifically’ speaking, 
death is among the most certain things 
in everyone’s life?
22 KATHERINE. Yes.
23 CHRISTIANUS. And you’re still not afraid of it?
24 KATHERINE. I just don’t see why I should be.
25 CHRISTIANUS. Well, then we certainly have a 
lot to talk about.
25
are very important: ‘what practically 
works’ is the pragmatist’s measure of 
success. The American philosopher Ri-
chard Rorty admits that the word ‘prag-
matism’ names ‘the chief glory of our 
country’s intellectual tradition’ (1982, p. 
161), but points out that Peirce’s con-
tribution ‘was merely to have given it 
a name, and to have stimulated James’ 
(1982, pp. 161–162). This is presum-
ably because Rorty thinks that the ‘great 
pragmatists’ only are those which were 
‘breaking with the Kantian epistemolog-
ical tradition altogether’ (1982, p. 161). 
Peirce himself says, ‘I devoted two hours 
a day to the study of Kant’s Critic of the 
Pure Reason for more than three years, 
until I almost knew the whole book by 
heart, and had critically examined every 
section of it’ (1955, p. 2); and it may 
be hard to claim — noting Peirce’s fre-
quent use of Kantian-flavoured ideas in 
his texts — that Peirce wasn’t some sort 
of Kantian. In any case, Rorty thinks 
that ‘Peirce himself remained the most 
Kantian of thinkers’ (1982, p. 161); 
consequently, Rorty promotes James 
and Dewey as the ‘great pragmatists’, 
but demotes Peirce.
 RICHARD RORTY (1982), Consequences 
of Pragmatism: Essays 1972–1980. Min-
neapolis, MN: University of Minnesota 
Press. 
 CHARLES SAUNDERS PEIRCE (1955), 
Philosophical Writings of Peirce. Selected 
and Edited With an Introduction by 
Justus Buchler. New York: Dover Pub-
lications, Inc.
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26 KATHERINE. We do?
27 CHRISTIANUS. Yes. But we desperately need 
that pizza now.
28 KATHERINE. I am sure the waiter will be here 
any minute.
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SCENE V.
The Mustachio Man
 CHRISTIANUS. All right. While we’re waiting 
for the waiter, I want to tell you a little 
secret of mine that got lost.
2 KATHERINE. Got lost?
3 CHRISTIANUS. Yes. I had it on the tip of my 
tongue right before you started to tell me 
about your lost luggage. But then I got 
so much into your little story that I to-
tally forgot to tell you mine.
4 KATHERINE. So what is it, that secret of 
yours?
5 CHRISTIANUS. Well, it’s not nearly as thrilling 
or dramatic as your revelation was. 
6 KATHERINE. OK, but what is it about?
7 CHRISTIANUS. Well, it’s just that your hair 
looks absolutely fabulous!
8 KATHERINE. Thank you! I am so glad you no-
ticed!
9 CHRISTIANUS. It’s a relatively recent creation, 
isn’t it?
0 KATHERINE. Yes, I just had it done. I needed 
to reinvent myself.
 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, we all need to reincarnate 
ourselves a little now and then. Actually, 
you look like Princess Nofret!
2 KATHERINE. Like a princess? How sweet of you! 
Who is she?
3 CHRISTIANUS. I am not exactly sure who she 
is now; but once upon a time she was the 
consort of the Mustachio Man, Prince 
Rahotep.
4 KATHERINE. Hmm, it sounds familiar. Rahotep, 
you say?
5 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, he was one of those ancient 
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v:11, Princess Nofret: Walther Wolf 
(1900–1973) includes a colour photo-
graph of a 1.18 meter high limestone 
statue of Princess Nofret (National Mu-
seum, Cairo), from the Early 4th Dy-
nasty, ca. 2575 B.C. (1972, p. 81). Her 
straight, thick, shoulder-length dark hair 
— which actually was a wig, according 
to Wolf (1972, p. 22) — is clearly seen, 
with a headband.
 WALTHER WOLF (1972), The Origins 
of Western Art: Egypt, Mesopotamia, The 
Aegan. London, England: Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson. Original edition (1969): 
Frühe Hochkulturen: Ägypten, Mesopota-
mien, Ägäis. Stuttgart, Germany: Chr. 
Belser Verlag.
v:13, Mustachio Man: Note here that 
Christianus uses ‘mustachio’ instead of 
‘moustache’ or ‘mustache’, etc. Henry 
W. Fowler observes that the noun ‘mus-
tachio’ is ‘now archaic for moustache’ 
(1965, p. 376); but Christianus presum-
ably uses ‘mustachio’ here to produce ex-
actly that archaic effect. Another reason 
to use ‘mustachio’, perhaps in addition 
to the first, may have been to add some 
more southern ring and flavour to the 
word, to indicate that the moustached 
man wasn’t very British, not even archai-
cally so. There is also the possibility that 
Christianus may have intended ‘musta-
chio’ to convey some ‘macho’ qualities.
v:13, Prince Rahotep: Wolf has pub-
lished a black-and-white photograph 
of a limestone statue of Prince Rahotep 
and his consort, where his moustache is 
clearly seen (1972, p. 26). Now, if we 
are to believe Arnold Hauser, the typical 
Egyptian artist focused on ‘thorough-
ness and precision of execution’ (1962, 
pp. 30–31), knowing that ‘originality 
of subject-matter’ was seldom appreci-
ated (1962, p. 30). If we accept some 
such premises, we might say that it is 
likely that the moustache appearing on 
Rahotep’s statue is not just a product of 
some liberal artist’s imaginary interven-
tion, but instead a rather accurate depic-
tion of one of Rahotep’s more distin-
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Egyptian princes.
6 KATHERINE. Of course! Egyptian! I got a lit-
tle confused because of the moustache. 
I have seen a lot of pictures of ancient 
Egyptian men with fancy beards, but not 
very many with moustaches. So in my 
head, the words ‘Egyptian’ and ‘mous-
tache’ just didn’t appear on the same 
page.
7 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, ancient Egyptian mous-
taches are quite rare commodities. They 
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guishing facial features.
 ARNOLD HAUSER (1962), The Social 
History of Art: From Prehistoric Times to 
the Middle Ages. London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul.
v:16, Egyptian . . . moustaches: Kath-
erine is not entirely wrong to say that 
Egyptian moustaches, and especially 
ancient Egyptian moustaches, are rela-
tively rarely found in books on ancient 
Egyptian archaeology and art. Vari-
ous types of beards, however, are much 
more common, as in, for example, the 
depictions of Amenophis III (Desro-
ches-Noblecourt 1965, p. 74), his son 
Amenhotep IV (Wolf 1972, p. 42), and 
Ramses II (Nawrath 1963, p. 89), etc. It 
may be interesting to note that many of 
the ancient Egyptian beards were actu-
ally wigs — worn on special occasions 
for religious or representative purposes 
(Nawrath 1963, p. 97), and sometimes 
referred to as being divine or ‘of the 
gods’ (Desroches-Noblecourt 1965, 
plate XX). However, Prince Rahotep’s 
moustache presumably was not a wig, but 
‘real’ and natural.
 ALFRED NAWRATH (1963), Egypten: 
Land av igår och idag. Preface by Pro-
fessor Torgny Säve-Söderbergh. Stock-
holm: Generalstabens Litografiska 
Anstalts Förlag. Original edition (1962): 
Ägypten: Land zwischen Sand und Strom. 
Bern: Kümmerly & Frey, Geographisch-
er Verlag.
 CHRISTIANE DESROCHES-NOBLECOURT 
(1965), Tutankhamen: Life and Death 
of a Pharaoh. With 32 colour plates by 
F. L. Kenett. Preface by His Excellency 
Sarwat Okasha, Member of the Execu-
tive Council of UNESCO. Colour-plate 
captions by Dr. A. Shoukry, Director 
General of the Antiquities Service of the 
UAR. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Pen-
guin Books, in association with George 
Rainbird.
The Mustachio Man
are definitely not on the CBOT!
8 KATHERINE. Definitely not! And judging from 
the latest Chicago developments, they 
never will be, either!
9 CHRISTIANUS. Probably not.
20 KATHERINE. In any case, I don’t like moustach-
es, so I have a tendency to forget about 
them very quickly. Actually, most of my 
female friends also dislike moustaches. 
2 CHRISTIANUS. Sure. But the princess presum-
ably saw something in Rahotep and his 
moustache, right?
22 KATHERINE. Presumably. But what would that 
be? 
23 CHRISTIANUS. Perhaps his moustache type can 
30
v:17, not on the CBOT: Christianus 
may indicate several things by saying 
that ancient Egyptian moustaches are 
definitely not on the CBOT (Chicago 
Board of Trade). One important thing 
that he may want to communicate is 
that the lack of such moustaches being 
traded on the CBOT is not an indication 
of that there are no such moustaches 
traded somewhere else; for such mous-
taches may be sold through much more 
private channels than those that typical 
Chicago commodities brokers normally 
use.
v:18, Chicago developments: Kather-
ine presumably knew that the CBOT had 
serious plans to merge with some other 
exchange, such as the CME (Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange) or the Atlanta-
based ICE (Intercontinental Exchange), 
as Reuters had reported (2007). And she 
may have been convinced at the time 
that the CBOT would merge, and in that 
process also stop to exist as the CBOT, in 
which case there would be no (old-style) 
CBOT left to trade anything at.
 REUTERS (2007), ‘UPDATE 2-ICE, CME 
ramp up rhetoric on dueling CBOT deals’. 
Reuters [http://www.reuters.com], Tues-
day, 20 March 2007, 4:16 p.m. EDT.
v:24, Hitler . . . Tulp: Furneaux (1969, 
p. 154) publishes one photograph of 
Adolf Hitler (1889–1945) where his 
moustache is clearly visible. A close-
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reveal something? 
24 KATHERINE. Maybe. Was it a more rectangu-
lar-shaped one, like the one Hitler used 
to have? Or was it a more spread-out 
thing, like the one Professor Tulp some-
times had?
25 CHRISTIANUS. No, it was smaller than any of 
those, and much less bushy. If you re-
member Clark Gable, then you would 
know which approximate moustache 
model I am talking about: a more sim-
ple, straightforward, streamlined design.
26 KATHERINE. Hmmm. Maybe one could live 
with one of those. It’s aesthetically clean-
er, more neutral. And it’s very intimate!
27 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, very intimate! And on top 
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up of the anatomy-lecturing Professor 
Tulp’s face, including his moustache, can 
be found in Rembrandt (1956, p. 40).
 RUPERT FURNEAUX (1969), Dramatis-
ka händelser i vår tid. With contribu-
tions by Sten Söderberg, Birger Nor-
man, Lars Widding, and Lars Skiöld. 
Edited by Marianne Särman. Translated 
by Jan Guillou. Höganäs, Sweden: Bok-
förlaget Bra Böcker. 
 REMBRANDT (1956), Tentoonstelling. 
Amsterdam: Rijksmuseum and Rotter-
dam: Museum Boymans.
v:25, Clark Gable: Clark Gable’s 
(1901–1960) moustache can, for exam-
ple, be seen in Frank Capra’s 1934 movie 
It Happened One Night (Heurling 1995, 
p. 182). A similar moustache model — 
although somewhat more extended than 
either Clark Gable’s or Prince Rahotep’s 
— may be found on the upper lip of 
the Bible-studying Mr. Spinoza (Kenny 
2006, p. 192; Bibliothèque nationale de 
France).
 BO HEURLING, ed. (1995), Norstedts 
Filmlexikon. With Contributions by 
Lars Axelson, Lasse Bergström, Bo Heu-
rling, Lars Åhlander. Stockholm: Nor-
stedts and Svenska Filminstitutet.
 ANTHONY KENNY (2006), The Rise of 
Modern Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press.
The Mustachio Man
of that, it’s also more practical and hygi-
enic: one would get much less pizza stuck 
in it.
28 KATHERINE. Did the prince eat a lot of pizza?
29 CHRISTIANUS. I am not sure; but I certainly 
eat a lot of pizza. So I am glad that I am 
not a mustachio man myself.
30 KATHERINE. I am glad too.
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SCENE VI.
Death Is Nothing Like a Toothache
 CHRISTIANUS. But I am not glad that the waiter 
is not here yet. What in the whole world 
are they doing in the kitchen? Are they 
waiting for the pizza harvest season?
2 KATHERINE. Take it easy, Chris! Why don’t 
you just take another breadstick, for 
now? I mean, the waiter must be here any 
second now. And you always tell me how 
important it is to be patient.
3 CHRISTIANUS. OK, OK! But I am starving!
4 KATHERINE. Why don’t we just continue our 
little toothache-and-death discussion 
while we wait? After all, you said that we 
have a lot to talk about.
5 CHRISTIANUS. Maybe we could do a little of 
that before the waiter arrives — if he ar-
rives. 
6 KATHERINE. So where would we re-enter that 
discussion, then?
7 CHRISTIANUS. Let’s see. Perhaps we could try 
something like this: Since you’re not 
afraid of death, but still hate toothaches, 
you must think that death is not anything 
like a toothache.
8 KATHERINE. Exactly. Death is nothing like a 
toothache.
9 CHRISTIANUS. How do you know that?
0 KATHERINE. Well, isn’t that what everyone be-
lieves nowadays?
 CHRISTIANUS. Well, I was talking about know-
ing, not believing. But, in any case, it is 
certainly correct to say that many people 
think like you do. But it is also correct to 
say that many people don’t think like you 
do; and I am one of them. So why do 
you believe that death is not like a tooth-
ache?
2 KATHERINE. As I see it, it’s not really about 
toothaches; it’s just that death is the end 
of everything in one’s life; nothing comes 
after that. So why worry about nothing-
ness? Why not just embrace carpe diem, 
and live fully, right here, right now?
3 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, if we were to accept some 
kind of nothingness as an accurate de-
scription of our individual future state, 
then of course we would not need to 
worry so much about any after-death 
scenarios. But why in the whole world 
would we accept such nothingness in the 
first place?
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v1:12, carpe diem: Brewer (1898) writes 
on the meaning of the Latin phrase carpe 
diem:  ‘Enjoy yourself while you have the 
opportunity. Seize the present day’.
4 KATHERINE. I just think it is unscientific not 
to accept it. For individual consciousness 
obviously depends on brain activity. And 
since physical death certainly means the 
annulment of brain activity, the correct 
conclusion must be that everyone’s indi-
vidual consciousness dissolves at the time 
of death. So death must be the end of 
consciousness, and, therefore, the start of 
nothingness. 
5 CHRISTIANUS. Oh, is that how you think?
6 KATHERINE. Yes. And I don’t see how one can 
conclude anything else, if one takes the 
current scientific evidence into consid-
eration.
7 CHRISTIANUS. Well, at least one thing is clear.
8 KATHERINE. What is that?
9 CHRISTIANUS. That you are in the hands of the 
scientists. 
20 KATHERINE. What do you mean?
2 CHRISTIANUS. I mean that you do not have 
to be in the hands of the scientists, if 
you don’t want to. You are an intelligent 
woman, and you should try to make up 
your own mind about the world and, in 
particular, about your own situation in 
35Death Is Nothing Like a Toothache
 EBENEZER COBHAM BREWER (1898), 
Dictionary of Phrase and Fable. New edi-
tion, revised, corrected, and enlarged. 
Philadelphia, PA: Henry Altermus Co.
it.
22 KATHERINE. I am sorry, but you lost me 
there. 
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SCENE VII.
Not In the Hands of the Scientists
 CHRISTIANUS. Well, at least I didn’t lose the 
waiter! Here he comes with our pizza! 
Praise the Lord!
2 KATHERINE. Ah, yes! It looks very good! Why 
don’t you start?
3 CHRISTIANUS. You are very merciful, my dear. 
4 KATHERINE. You were saying?
5 CHRISTIANUS. I am not sure what I said; I lost 
track. Just smell the pizza! Ha!
6 KATHERINE. You said something about that 
I should make up my own mind about 
what happens at the time of death.
7 CHRISTIANUS. Ah, yes; now I remember. Well, 
I am sure that you, as a professional 
lawyer, can appreciate the idea that the 
scientists, like everyone else, have their 
agenda. Their project is to protect their 
theories, their jobs, their careers, and, ul-
timately, their position in society. They 
want to convince you to sponsor their ac-
tivities, so that they can continue getting 
paid to do what they want to do, namely 
their own research.
8 KATHERINE. Of course they want to keep their 
theories, jobs and careers! Who doesn’t?
9 CHRISTIANUS. Sure. But the fact that they want 
to keep their jobs, their careers, and their 
points of view does not mean that you 
must support them having those jobs, 
those careers, and those points of view. 
0 KATHERINE. How do you mean?
 CHRISTIANUS. For example, the fact that some 
mafioso is very eager to keep his ideas, 
his habits, his palace, his private army 
of gangsters, and his overall position in 
society does not imply that I, or you, or 
the government, are obliged to support 
his plans, his actions, his mobsters, or 
his points of view; we are certainly en-
titled to protest in various ways against 
such a man’s activities, at least if we live 
in a country that not only advertises free 
speech and proper legal procedures but 
actually practices them.
2 KATHERINE. But how are scientists like mafio-
sos? Where’s the analogy?
3 CHRISTIANUS. It’s a long story. So let me put 
it like this instead: you don’t have to ac-
cept the invitation from the scientists 
to support their research, their educa-
tional activities, and their perspectives if 
38
v11:13, AAAS: This is an acronym for 
the American Association for the Ad-
vancement of Science [http://www.aaas.
org]; Science [http://www.scienceonline.
org] is one of their publications.
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you don’t want to. So you don’t have to 
enrol at Harvard or Princeton and pay 
large sums of money in the form of tui-
tion and fees; and you don’t have to sub-
scribe to Science or otherwise support the 
AAAS; and, above all, you don’t have to 
subscribe to any Darwinism, Big Bang, 
or quantum mechanics, if you don’t want 
to. It’s up to you.
4 KATHERINE. What do you mean, their per-
spectives? Aren’t the scientists interested 
in objectivity?
5 CHRISTIANUS. Sure. But the scientists use vari-
ous strategies to sell in their little theories; 
and the objectivity story is just one of 
those. But you don’t have to accept their 
objectivity proposal, if you don’t want 
to. No one has proven that objectivity is 
in principle possible, or that objectivity is 
the only road to knowledge, or that sub-
jective knowledge is less worth, or any 
such things. And, more importantly, no 
one has proven that objectivity is good 
for you, or that subjectivity is not good 
for you. So why not fly your own way, 
like Jonathan Livingston Seagull?
6 KATHERINE. You can’t be serious?
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v11:15, Jonathan Livingston Seagull: 
There are many inspiring passages in Ri-
chard Bach’s book about a seagull who 
goes his own way. One passage is this: 
‘Jonathan nodded obediently. For the 
next few days he tried to behave like the 
Not In the Hands of the Scientists
SCENE VIII.
Important and Unimportant 
Knowledge
 CHRISTIANUS. I am dead serious. But let me 
rephrase myself, so that I don’t unneces-
sarily upset your so easily offended mind; 
for without a relaxed and cooperative 
mind you will not be in a position to un-
derstand very much.
2 KATHERINE. OK.
3 CHRISTIANUS. Now, do we agree, tentatively 
speaking, that knowledge is something 
that may be worth having?
4 KATHERINE. Yes.
5 CHRISTIANUS. So if one doesn’t already have 
knowledge, it may be worthwhile to 
search for it?
6 KATHERINE. Surely.  
7 CHRISTIANUS. And is it true that many people 
indeed are searching for it, and have been 
other gulls; he really tried, screeching 
and fighting with the flock around the 
piers and fishing boats, diving on scraps 
of fish and bread. But he couldn’t make 
it work. It’s all so pointless, he thought, 
deliberately dropping a hard-won an-
chovy to a hungry old gull chasing him. 
I could be spending all this time learn-
ing to fly. There’s so much to learn!’ 
(1973, p. 15).
 RICHARD BACH (1973), Jonathan Liv-
ingston Seagull. Photographs by Rus-
sell Munson. London and Sydney: Pan 
Books.
searching for it?
8 KATHERINE. Yes.
9 CHRISTIANUS. And do we also agree that the 
definition of knowledge is not firmly set-
tled, and that many philosophers have 
defined it in various ways?
0 KATHERINE. Well, I can’t really say — you know 
the philosophers better than I do.  But I 
actually do remember the Daubert case 
in the 990s where neither the Supreme 
Court nor the scientists could present an 
accurate definition of what scientific ex-
pert knowledge really amounted to.
 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, I heard about that case. So, 
loosely speaking, we may say that some 
people not only search for knowledge, 
but also search for definitions of what 
knowledge really is, and how it should 
be obtained?
2 KATHERINE. Certainly.
3 CHRISTIANUS. And perhaps we also agree that 
an individual man or woman cannot 
know everything there is to know about 
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v111:10, the Daubert case: The U. S. 
Supreme Court explicitly addressed the 
adjective ‘scientific’ and said that it ‘im-
plies a grounding in the methods and 
procedures of science’ (509 U.S. 579, p. 
590); but it didn’t specify to any greater 
extent what those methods and proce-
dures of science amounts to, or what 
‘science’ is. And in terms of the defini-
tion of ‘knowledge’ the Supreme Court 
said: ‘Of course, it would be unreason-
able to conclude that the subject of sci-
entific testimony must be “known” to a 
certainty; arguably, there are no certain-
Important and Unimportant Knowledge
the universe or about himself and his 
body, at least not in an ordinary sense of 
the word, and at least not in the ordinary 
human condition?
4 KATHERINE. Certainly.
5 CHRISTIANUS. And he also cannot personally 
experience every possible situation, loca-
tion, or person on this planet?
6 KATHERINE. No.
7 CHRISTIANUS. So he cannot possibly know eve-
rything there is to know about this planet, 
either from his own personal experience 
or from other people’s experiences?
8 KATHERINE. No.
9 CHRISTIANUS. So then he must intelligently se-
lect which personal experiences he wants 
to have, and which testimonies he wants 
to listen to, right?
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ties in science’ (509 U.S. 579, p. 590). 
In addition, two interesting briefs were 
used in the process of this case, neither 
of which clarifies the matter very much. 
First, Amici Curiae 9 (by Nicolaas Blo-
embergen et al.) states that ‘Indeed, 
scientists do not assert that they know 
what is immutably “true”—they are 
committed to searching for new, tem-
porary, theories to explain, as best they 
can, phenomena’ (509 U.S. 579, p. 590). 
Second, Amici Curiae 7–8 (by the Amer-
ican Association for the Advancement of 
Science) states: ‘Science is not an ency-
clopedic body of knowledge about the 
universe. Instead, it represents a process 
for proposing and refining theoretical 
explanations about the world that are 
subject to further testing and refine-
ment’ (509 U.S. 579, p. 590; emphasis in 
original).
 509 U.S. 579 (1993) ‘Daubert et ux., 
individually and as guardians ad litem 
for Daubert, et al. v. Merrell Dow Phar-
maceuticals, Inc. Certiorari to the Unit-
ed States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit. No. 92-102. Argued March 30, 
1993—Decided June 28, 1993.’
Katherine’s Questionable Quest
20 KATHERINE. How do you mean?
2 CHRISTIANUS. Let’s say that you only have a 
few days off, and that you want to ac-
quire some typical vacational knowledge 
on some sunny island somewhere. Must 
you then not choose between, say, either 
going to Hawaii, or to the Canary Is-
lands?
22 KATHERINE. Well, yes. If I only have a few 
days at my disposal, there’s only time to 
go to one of those destinations.
23 CHRISTIANUS. Exactly. Or let’s say that you 
have a few years to restart a new career, 
and that you need some suitable voca-
tional prepping for getting a new job. 
Must you then not choose between, say, 
either going to medical school or to busi-
ness school?
24 KATHERINE. Yes.
43
v111:21, vacational: This adjective is 
not listed in all English dictionaries, and 
it may or may not be a concoction by 
Christianus. In any case, ‘vacational’ is 
listed in Roget (1962, p. 471), togeth-
er with other synonymous adjectives: 
‘holiday, ferial, festal; sabbatic(al)’. It 
may also be important to note that one 
meaning associated with the word ‘vaca-
tion’ is ‘weeks during which universities 
and law-courts stop work’ (Hornby and 
Parnwell 1962, p. 478).
 A. S. HORNBY and E. C. PARNWELL (1962), 
Oxford English-Reader’s Dictionary. Re-
printed with corrections. Stockholm: 
Svenska Bokförlaget/Norsteds, and Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press.
 PETER MARK ROGET (1962), Roget’s 
International Thesaurus. Third Edition. 
New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Com-
pany.
Important and Unimportant Knowledge
25 CHRISTIANUS. So then we must carefully 
choose what type of experiences and what 
type of knowledge we want to have?
26 KATHERINE. Yes.
27 CHRISTIANUS. And we agree, I guess, that the 
kind of knowledge that makes a painter a 
painter is not necessarily the same as that 
which makes a biologist a biologist?
28 KATHERINE. Definitely.
29 CHRISTIANUS. So what is considered impor-
tant knowledge for a biologist may not 
be important knowledge for a painter?
30 KATHERINE. Sure.
3 CHRISTIANUS. And, conversely, what is consid-
ered important knowledge for a painter 
may not be important knowledge for the 
biologist?
32 KATHERINE. Right.
33 CHRISTIANUS. In other words, what is impor-
tant knowledge for one person may be 
unimportant knowledge for another?
34 KATHERINE. Yes, it may.
35 CHRISTIANUS. So if your primary goal is, let’s 
say, to become a practicing physician, 
then you must, in regards to your own 
life, regard all knowledge that pertains 
to a physician’s education, and to the 
process of actually ending up being hired 
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as a physician, as the most important 
knowledge. Everything else is, for you, 
less important. In other words, the most 
important knowledge for you, in such a 
case, would be that knowledge that can 
‘actualize’ your dreams of ending up as a 
practicing physician.
36 KATHERINE. Yes.
37 CHRISTIANUS. But if your primary goal is, 
for instance, to find your soul-mate, and 
you perceive your future job as relatively 
unimportant, then whatever knowledge 
that leads you to the man of your dreams 
must be the most important knowledge 
for you.
38 KATHERINE. Yes.
39 CHRISTIANUS. And this must go on until you 
have reached your initial goal; or, if you 
realize at some point that your initial 
goal was inadequate in some way, until 
you have reached some new goal that you 
have selected.
40 KATHERINE. Yes.
4 CHRISTIANUS. So ultimately you are the judge: 
you decide how important you should 
make each ‘piece’ of experience, and each 
‘piece’ of knowledge.
42 KATHERINE. But it almost sounds too good to 
be true!
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43 CHRISTIANUS. Perhaps. But sometimes things 
almost are too good to be true. More 
pizza, mademoiselle?
44 KATHERINE. Yes, please. It was so good!
46 Katherine’s Questionable Quest
SCENE IX.
Physicians Can’t Stop Death
 CHRISTIANUS. And now let’s get back to our 
real problem, namely death!
2 KATHERINE. But I am still eating! Can’t we 
continue that lethal conversation some 
other time?
3 CHRISTIANUS. No, it’s better that we proceed.
4 KATHERINE. Why?
5 CHRISTIANUS. Because in five minutes, or in 
five hours, or in five days, one of us may 
be dead; and then we can’t continue this 
very important discussion. 
6 KATHERINE. Why would that matter?
7 CHRISTIANUS. Well, perhaps it wouldn’t have 
mattered if our final state were nothing 
but nothingness. 
8 KATHERINE. Yes, that’s what I have been say-
ing all along!
9 CHRISTIANUS. But, as I have hinted before, 
I don’t see any good reason to take the 
nothingness scenario very seriously.
0 KATHERINE. Why not?
 CHRISTIANUS. Because it isn’t proven.
2 KATHERINE. What are you saying?
3 CHRISTIANUS. I am saying that no one has 
proven that the nothingness scenario is 
correct. 
4 KATHERINE. So?
5 CHRISTIANUS. So why believe it?
6 KATHERINE. Well, I believe it because I think 
it is correct. I think it sounds right.
7 CHRISTIANUS. But that’s not very scientific!
8 KATHERINE. Maybe not. But the scientists will 
soon have figured out a way to save us 
from death, anyway.
9 CHRISTIANUS. You see, that’s one of your prob-
lems: you are in the hands of the scien-
tists. You have too much faith in them!
20 KATHERINE. But they are very capable and in-
ventive!
2 CHRISTIANUS. Sometimes. But that doesn’t 
guarantee that they will be able to stop 
death. Albert Einstein, for example, was 
a very capable and inventive man, but 
he couldn’t stop death. He died himself. 
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1x:21, Einstein: One may get a rough 
estimate of the influence of Albert Ein-
stein’s (1879–1955) work by inspecting 
Bynum, Browne and Porter’s dictionary, 
where Einstein’s name appears in twen-
ty-five different entries (1981, p. 463): 
‘Absolute space and time, Aether, Black-
body law, Complementarity, Electron, 
Expanding Universe, Geometry, Grav-
ity, Heat and thermodynamics, Indeter-
minism, Light, Lightquantum, Mach’s 
Principle, Mass, Michelson-Morley 
experiment, Philosophy, Photoelectric 
effect, Quantum, Rational reconstruc-
tion, Relative space and time, Relativ-
ity, Simplicity, Space-time, Unified field 
theory, X-rays’.
 W. F. BYNUM, E. J. BROWNE, and ROY POR-
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They all do.
22 KATHERINE. Well, perhaps they can’t stop 
death right now. But they are trying!
23 CHRISTIANUS. Well, they may say or imply that 
they are trying, so that they, for example, 
can get more money to do their research. 
But that doesn’t mean that they actually 
will be able to stop death. I mean, they 
can’t even stop Alzheimer’s yet!
24 KATHERINE. But that’s not the same problem!
25 CHRISTIANUS. You are absolutely right: it isn’t 
the same problem. Stopping death is 
much harder.
26 KATHERINE. But some progress in regards to 
death has been made, right?
27 CHRISTIANUS. No. There is no progress in 
terms of stopping death.
49
TER, eds. (1981), Dictionary of the His-
tory of Science. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press.
1x:23, Alzheimer’s: Christianus may, 
for example, have read Pierson’s report: 
‘Natexis Bleichroeder analyst Corey 
Davis said Alzheimer’s research “has 
been a graveyard of failed drugs, so it is 
not surprising that any such product in 
development would be deemed at high 
risk”’ (2007).
 RANSDELL PIERSON (2007), ‘Wy-
eth says Alzheimer program a justified 
long-shot’. Reuters [http://www.reuters.
com], Tuesday, 20 March 2007, 1:24 
p.m. EDT.
Physicians Can’t Stop Death
SCENE X.
Are Foetuses Potential Persons?
 KATHERINE. Chris, don’t be foolish! Of course 
there is progress! Just take the case of a 
pregnant woman whose life is threatened 
by her foetus. Nowadays the physicians 
can save the pregnant woman’s life by a 
small operation that simply removes the 
foetus and lets the woman live.
2 CHRISTIANUS. But in order to ‘save’ the preg-
nant woman in such a life-threatening 
situation, they are sometimes forced to 
kill the foetus. So the progress in terms 
of stopping death, in such a scenario, 
would then translate to the ability to kill 
x:1, foetus: An alternative form of the 
word ‘foetus’ is ‘fetus’, and is commonly 
used in the United States of America.
x:4, potential person: Mary Anne 
Warren has written an interesting article 
about abortion. She says: ‘Once a preg-
nant woman has committed herself to 
the continued nurturance of the fetus, 
she and those close to her are likely to 
think of it as an ‘unborn baby’, and to 
value it for its potential. The fetus’s po-
tential lies not just in its DNA, but in that 
maternal (and paternal) commitment’ 
(1993, pp. 312–313).
 MARY ANNE WARREN (1993), ‘Abor-
tion’ in Peter Singer, ed., A Companion 
to Ethics. Oxford, England and Cam-
bridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, pp. 
303–313.
x:4, Chargaff-inspired: According to 
Mader (1990, p. 222), Edwin Chargaff’s 
data showed two things about DNA. The 
first one was that DNA has ‘the variability 
required of the genetic material’ (1990, 
p. 222; Mader’s emphasis). The concen-
tration of DNA’s four bases — adenine 
(A), thymine (T), cytosine (C), and 
guanine (G) — varies in different spe-
cies: for example, in Homo sapiens the 
concentration is 31.0% (A), 31.5% (T), 
19.1% (G), and 18.4% (C), while it in, 
for example, Bacillus subtilis is 28.4% 
someone, namely the foetus. It is by such 
killings that the physicians ‘save’ lives.
3 KATHERINE. But that is, of course, only if we 
agree that the foetus is a person, or a po-
tential person; otherwise it wouldn’t be 
killing.
4 CHRISTIANUS. But why wouldn’t we agree that 
the foetus is, at the very least, a potential 
person? Are you saying that the foetus has 
non-human DNA? Or are you perhaps 
challenging the modern DNA researchers 
and their Chargaff-inspired theories?
5 KATHERINE. No, I am not interested in chal-
lenging any DNA research right now. I 
know too little. And I don’t think that I 
want to say that the foetus has non-hu-
man DNA, either. But I could, perhaps, 
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(A), 29.0% (T), 21.0% (G), 21.6% (C). 
The second thing was that DNA ‘has a 
constancy required of the genetic mate-
rial’ (1990, p. 222; Mader’s emphasis). 
This ‘constancy’ feature, sometimes re-
ferred to as Chargaff’s rule, amounts to 
that the concentrations of the four ni-
trogenous bases occur in pairs: ‘adenine 
in equal concentrations to thymine, and 
cytosine in equal concentrations to gua-
nine’ (Lapczynski 1999, p. 283). Thus, 
in Homo sapiens, the concentration of 
adenine and thymine are both approxi-
mately 31%, and the concentration of 
guanine and cytosine are both approxi-
mately 19%; similarly, in Bacillus sub-
tilis, the concentration of adenine and 
thymine are both approximately 29%, 
and the concentration of guanine and 
cytosine are both approximately 21%. 
 KATE LAPCZYNSKI (1999), ‘Genetics, 
Historical Development of ’ in Jeffrey A. 
Knight and Robert McClenaghan, eds., 
Encyclopedia of Genetics. 2 vols. Pasade-
na, CA and Hackensack, NJ: Salem Press, 
Inc.
 SYLVIA S. MADER (1990), Biology. Third 
edition. Contributors: Cellular Energy 
and Botany: W. Dennis Clark; Genetics: 
Robert M. Kitchin; Ecology: Thomas C. 
Emmel; Critical Thinking Case Studies: 
Robert D. Allen. Dubuque, IA: Wm. C. 
Brown Publishers.
Are Foetuses Potential Persons?
say that that there is no guarantee that 
the foetus will develop in such a way that 
it will end up with an ordinary human 
consciousness. In other words, the foe-
tus may not develop in such a way as to 
become a fully conscious and fully func-
tional person.
6 CHRISTIANUS. But you could say that about a 
newborn as well.
7 KATHERINE. Sure, but the newborn is no 
longer in the womb.
8 CHRISTIANUS. I don’t see very much difference 
there. In any case, let’s play with your 
idea that the foetus may not become a 
fully conscious, fully functional person, 
and therefore may not even be regarded 
as a potential person.
9 KATHERINE. OK.
0 CHRISTIANUS. But that would not give us any 
automatic licence to not refer to its ‘re-
moval’ as ‘killing’. I mean, we commonly 
use the verb ‘kill’ not just when we talk 
about human beings, but also when talk 
about animals. And animals are not nor-
mally thought of as persons. So if we in 
our little thought experiment were to 
classify a foetus as some type of animal 
with a ‘lower’ and ‘non-human’ con-
sciousness, we could still speak of killing 
it, even though it, in such a scenario, nei-
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ther would be regarded as a person nor 
a potential person. In fact, thousands or 
millions of animals such as flies, mosqui-
toes, cows, and pigs are killed every day 
in private homes, slaughterhouses and 
medical research facilities.
 KATHERINE. So perhaps we may speak of kill-
ing the foetus. How is that?
2 CHRISTIANUS. That’s much better. But the im-
portant point in the present discussion is 
of course that, in the case of the pregnant 
woman, the physicians didn’t save the 
woman permanently from dying; instead, 
they just gave her a little more time to 
live her earthly life, and they did so by 
killing the foetus. The woman still has to 
die, sooner or later, in some other way. In 
other words, not only have they not per-
manently saved the woman from dying; 
they have also actively killed the foetus. 
So where is the accomplishment?
3 KATHERINE. Well, you have to admit that it 
is a somewhat strange example: I mean, 
how many women are put in serious bio-
logical danger by their foetuses?
4 CHRISTIANUS. Sure, such cases are relatively 
rare. But it’s your example. You chose it, 
not I. So why don’t we take a much more 
common example in which women are 
not put in any serious biological danger 
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by their foetuses, but where women still, 
for other reasons, participate in the act of 
killing their foetuses?
5 KATHERINE. Are you referring to regular abor-
tion?
6 CHRISTIANUS. Yes.
7 KATHERINE. But sometimes women are raped. 
Are you saying that women shouldn’t be 
allowed to abort in such cases?
8 CHRISTIANUS. No, that’s not at all what I am 
saying. I am trying, unlike you, to focus 
on the current issue, which is that there 
is no progress in terms of stopping death. 
9 KATHERINE. But surely there is some progress? 
For example, many women nowadays 
experience much greater individual free-
dom because of the advances in abortive 
methods; and as a woman I really appre-
ciate that.
20 CHRISTIANUS. I was talking about death, not 
freedom. In any case, there is no doubt 
about that some people are apprecia-
tive of the current state of affairs. But 
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x:20, as progress: Christianus seems 
to view ‘progress’ as something that is 
measured in relation to a certain phi-
losophy, or a certain set of ideas or 
beliefs. This may be compared to Paul 
Feyerabend’s discussion of ‘progress’, 
‘advance’, and ‘improvement’ in Against 
Method: ‘Everyone can read the terms in 
his own way and in accordance with the 
tradition to which he belongs. Thus 
for an empiricist, “progress” will mean 
transition to a theory that provides di-
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in order to see today’s state of affairs as 
progress one would have to agree that the 
pregnant woman’s freedom of choice is 
the main concern, and that the foetus’s 
future and freedom is of less concern, or 
even much less concern. 
2 KATHERINE. Sure. But so what?
22 CHRISTIANUS. So what? The thing is, one 
doesn’t have to believe that women have 
a right to decide whether or not they 
want to kill the foetus, just as one doesn’t 
have to believe that women have a right 
to decide whether or not they want to 
kill anyone or anything that has, or hasn’t, 
human DNA. For if one didn’t think that 
women had such a right in the first place, 
and if one didn’t think that it would be 
desirable to implement such a right in 
human society, then one wouldn’t neces-
sarily conclude that today’s state of af-
fairs would be any progress. One might 
instead conclude, for example, that the 
huge number of unborn babies being 
aborted out of existence every year using 
various medical technologies for various 
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rect empirical tests for most of its basic 
assumptions. Some people believe the 
quantum theory to be a theory of this 
kind. For others, “progress” may mean 
unification and harmony, perhaps even 
at the expense of empirical adequacy. 
This is how Einstein viewed the general 
theory of relativity’ (1988, pp. 18–19; 
emphasis in original).
 PAUL FEYERABEND (1988), Against 
Method. Revised edition. London and 
New York: Verso.
Are Foetuses Potential Persons?
non-life-threatening reasons is an indica-
tion of an increasing disrespect for human 
life, and a degradation of human society.
23 KATHERINE. Are you implying that there is 
something morally wrong with the view 
that women have a right to abort?
24 CHRISTIANUS. It is a very complex issue, and 
I don’t want to get into it right now. In-
stead, I want to concentrate on my main 
point, namely that regardless of whatever 
else is going on in today’s Western world, 
there is no progress in terms of stopping 
death. There hasn’t been a single case in 
which the physicians have permanently 
saved anyone from dying.
25 KATHERINE. What about cryogenics?
26 CHRISTIANUS. You mean cryonics, Katherine. 
That’s just the art of putting an already 
dead person in the freezer, isn’t it?
27 KATHERINE. What do you mean?
28 CHRISTIANUS. I mean there is no treatment 
involved. They just quickly put the de-
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x:25, cryogenics: Abate defines the 
word ‘cryogenics’ as ‘the branch of phys-
ics dealing with very low temperatures’ 
(1998, p. 202).
 FRANK ABATE, ed. (1998), The DK Il-
lustrated Oxford Dictionary. New York: 
Dorling Kindersley and Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
x:26, cryonics: Gallery defines the 
word ‘cryonics’ (cryonic suspension) as 
‘the cold storage of clinically dead peo-
ple at very low temperatures, typically 
in liquid nitrogen at –196 celsius, until 
some future date when it is hoped that 
medical science will have progressed to 
the point where the body can be revived 
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ceased person in cold storage and hope 
that future medical technology will be 
able to bring him back; and if technol-
ogy does come to such a point, then the 
cryonics people presumably just heat the 
poor frozen fellow up a bit, after which 
they immediately hand him over to the 
physicians; and then the physicians pro-
vide the actual medical treatment, what-
ever it might be.
29 KATHERINE. But that doesn’t sound so bad, 
does it? I mean, it’s a chance, right? There 
are so many cases where emergency room 
physicians have successfully revived pa-
tients who have lost all their vital signs. 
So cryonics doesn’t seem to be totally off, 
does it?
30 CHRISTIANUS. Well, maybe not. But my main 
point is still that no physician has perma-
nently saved anyone from dying. So even 
if cryonics and an improving medical 
technology may set the stage for a tem-
porary revival of a previously cryossified 
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and the cause of death reversed’ (2001, 
p. 131).
 STEVEN GALLERY (2001), ‘Cryonics’ in 
Glennys Howarth and Oliver Leaman, 
eds., Encyclopedia of Death and Dying. 
London and New York: Routledge.
x:30, cryossified: This adjective seems 
to be Christianus’s own combination of 
the word ‘cryo’ (Gr. kryos cold, frost) and 
the word ‘ossified’ (Lat. ossis of a bone). 
He might refer to a fixed, bone-like state 
of affairs (‘set in bone’) that is accom-
plished by a process of freezing that uses 
cold or super-cold temperatures. The us-
age note on ‘ossify’ provided by Harber 
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corpse, it’s not a permanent comeback in 
any case. Whoever comes back still has to 
die, a little later.
3 KATHERINE. OK, let’s forget about cryonics, 
for now. But at least we can say that, on 
average, human beings live longer today 
than they previously did, according to 
current statistics?
32 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, at least in some countries 
and regions.
33 KATHERINE. Not all?
34 CHRISTIANUS. Certainly not. Far from it. At 
least if we are to believe the numbers in 
WHO’s The World Health Report.
35 KATHERINE. What are the numbers?
36 CHRISTIANUS. The numbers are . . . ta-ta-ta-
taaa-taaa-taaa-tiiiii . . . 2 . . . 26 . . . 37 . 
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and Payton (1995, p. 716) may also be 
interesting to consult in this connexion: 
‘“the old man’s attitudes have ossified 
amid the social changes of today” (= be-
come fixed or set)’.
 KATHERINE HARBER and GEOFFREY PAY-
TON, eds. (1995), Heinemann English 
Dictionary. Fully revised and updated. 
Oxford: Heinemann Educational.
x:34, The World Health Report: WHO 
publishes The World Health Report once 
a year, and it is available on the WHO 
website [http://www.who.int]. Chris-
tianus seems to have used the WHO 2000 
and WHO 2006 reports [cf. X:42 and on-
ward].
 WHO (2000), The World Health Re-
port 2000: Health systems: improving per-
formance. Geneva, Switzerland: World 
Health Organization.
 WHO (2006), The World Health Re-
port 2006: Working together for health. 
Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Or-
ganization.
x:40, quick sample: Christianus pro-
vides a ‘quick sample’ reading, seeming-
ly indicating that he is not overwhelm-
ingly concerned with any particular 
level of accuracy in the reading of the 
WHO figures, or with whether there are 
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. .
37 KATHERINE. C’mon, Chris! No lotto an-
nouncement, please!
38 CHRISTIANUS. All right. But sometimes it’s 
important to play around a bit, and not 
take things too seriously. 
39 KATHERINE. Yes, sometimes. So what do you 
have?
40 CHRISTIANUS. Well, there are so many num-
bers, so many countries, so many years. 
And so little time. So I’ll just give you a 
quick sample.
4 KATHERINE. OK.
42 CHRISTIANUS. Out of those twenty-eight 
countries whose names start with either 
‘A’ or ‘B’, ten countries have lower life ex-
pectancy figures for the year 2004 than 
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five or fifteen countries of the twenty-
eight that have decreasing life expect-
ances. And although Christianus does 
not reveal the exact nature of his ‘quick 
sample’ reading, we may note two things 
about how the data in the WHO reports 
may have been read. First, since the WHO 
uses one decimal in their 1999 data, but 
no decimals in their 2004 data, Chris-
tianus’s ‘quick sample’ reading may have 
rounded off the 1999 data to the near-
est integer, thus reading, for example, 
‘42.3’ as ‘42’, and ‘67.8’ as ‘68’. Second, 
although the WHO tables present differ-
ent ‘uncertainty intervals’ for different 
countries and different years, Chris-
tianus’s ‘quick sample’ reading may not 
have taken these into account.
x:42, ten countries: According to WHO 
2000 (p. 156) and WHO 2006 (p. 169), 
these ten countries (out of those twenty-
eight whose name starts either with ‘A’ 
or ‘B’) have, on a ‘quick sample’ reading 
[cf. X:40], life expectancy figures that are 
dropping from 1999 to 2004, for either 
males or females or both: Afghanistan, 
Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Barbados, Belize, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Brunei Darussalam, 
and Burundi.
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for the year 999.
43 KATHERINE. Really?
44 CHRISTIANUS. Yes. In six countries the life 
expectancy drops for both males and fe-
males; in three other countries it drops 
for males only; and in one other country 
it drops for females only.
45 KATHERINE. But surely all the countries in 
the Western world are not among those? 
They must have increasing life expect-
ancy numbers?
46 CHRISTIANUS. Well, it depends what you 
mean by ‘the Western world’. If you, for 
example, count Bosnia and Herzegovina 
as being part of ‘the Western world’, then 
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x:42, year 2004 . . . year 1999: The life 
expectancy numbers (‘Life Expectancy 
at Birth’) for the years 1999 and 2004 
can be found in The World Health Report 
2000 and The World Health Report 2006, 
respectively. Note that the WHO seems to 
compile their more recent reports in a 
slower tempo than they did before: up 
to and including The World Health Re-
port 2003 the report included data per-
taining to the previous year; but starting 
with The World Health Report 2004 they 
seem to delay the publication of the data 
one more year. This is why the 2006 re-
port presents data from 2004, while the 
2000 report presents data from 1999.
x:44, six countries: According to WHO 
2000 (p. 156) and WHO 2006 (p. 169), 
the following six countries have, on a 
‘quick sample’ reading [cf. X:40], drop-
ping life expectancy numbers (‘Life Ex-
pectancy at Birth’) from 1999 to 2004, 
for both males and females. Afghanistan: 
males go from 45.3 to 42 years; females 
from 47.2 to 42 years. Angola: males go 
from 46.3 to 38 years; females from 49.1 
to 42 years. Antigua and Barbuda: males 
go from 71.4 to 70 years; females from 
76.8 to 75 years. Armenia: males go 
from 72.3 to 65 years; females from 77.1 
to 72 years. Azerbaijan: males go from 
67.8 to 63 years; females from 75.3 to 
68 years. Belize: males go from 69.6 to 
65 years; females from 75.0 to 72 years.
x:44, three countries: According to 
WHO 2000 (p. 156) and WHO 2006 (p. 
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you may not necessarily be right.
47 KATHERINE. Really?
48 CHRISTIANUS. Yes. In Bosnia and Herzegovi-
na the life expectancy is dropping for 
males.
49 KATHERINE. But isn’t there room for some sta-
tistical errors?
50 CHRISTIANUS. Sure, there is always room for 
that. And this is a quick sample of the 
WHO reports, as I said — and God 
knows where those data come from, any-
way. So the numbers and trends may be 
rather uncertain, including those that 
show increasing life expectancy figures.
5 KATHERINE. Point well taken. But at least 
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169), the following three countries have, 
on a ‘quick sample’ reading [cf. X:40], 
dropping life expectancy numbers (‘Life 
Expectancy at Birth’) from 1999 to 
2004, for males only. Barbados: males go 
from 72.7 to 71 years; women from 77.8 
to 78 years. Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
males go from 71.2 to 70 years; females 
from 75.0 to 77 years. Burundi: males 
go from 43.2 to 42 years; females from 
43.8 to 47 years.
x:44, one other country: According 
to WHO 2000 (p. 156) and WHO 2006 
(p. 169), one country has, on a ‘quick 
sample’ reading [cf. X:40], dropping life 
expectancy numbers (‘Life Expectancy 
at Birth’) from 1999 to 2004, for females 
only. Brunei Darussalam: males go from 
74.5 to 76 years; females from 79.8 to 
78 years.
x:50, God knows: One may, for exam-
ple, note the following WHO statement: 
‘Figures computed by WHO to ensure 
comparability; they are not necessarily 
the official statistics of Member States, 
which may use alternative rigorous 
methods’ (2006, p. 168).
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America and Britain have increasing life 
expectancy figures, don’t they?
52 CHRISTIANUS. Yes. But that may still not indi-
cate any progress for you, in any case.
53 KATHERINE. Are you insane? Isn’t it progress 
when we have increasing life expectancy 
numbers? Isn’t it progress to have more 
years to live?
54 CHRISTIANUS. Well, the problem is just that 
those life expectancy numbers don’t say 
that you have more years to live; they are 
just part of some average population sta-
tistics. So just as no actual living person 
has .7 kids or 2.2 cars in their little sub-
urban family, the average life expectancy 
figures may not pertain to any specific, 
individual person either. Therefore, it is 
no guarantee that you, as an individual 
person, will reach the ‘life expectancy’ 
age and be able to ‘take advantage’ of 
the latest longevity research. So it may 
not indicate any progress for you, person-
ally. For instance, you may be hit by a 
truck tomorrow and die immediately, 
without getting any chance of becoming 
the proud owner of the latest pacemaker 
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x:51, America and Britain: According 
to WHO 2000 (p. 163) and WHO 2006 (p. 
177), the United States of America has, 
on a ‘quick sample’ reading [cf. X:40], 
increasing life expectancy numbers 
(‘Life Expectancy at Birth’) from 1999 
to 2004, for males only: males go from 
73.8 to 75 years; women from 79.7 to 
technology.
55 KATHERINE. I see your point.
56 CHRISTIANUS. And the main problem remains: 
all people on this planet are dying. With 
or without pacemakers, ordinary people 
in this time and age do not live more 
than approximately 00 years: and some 
only get 80 years of life, others only 60, 
40, or 20, etc. Everyone is still dying.
57 KATHERINE. So you are saying that there is no 
difference?
58 CHRISTIANUS. There is no difference in terms 
of death: everyone still has to die. But 
there is, of course, some difference in 
terms of what happens just before one 
dies: the physicians sometimes can keep 
the patient alive a few hours, days, weeks, 
or months more. But they can’t do it con-
sistently, for all patients; they can only do 
it for some. And even if they could do it 
consistently, for all patients, it wouldn’t 
be any real progress anyway.
59 KATHERINE. Why not?
60 CHRISTIANUS. Because real progress is to be 
able to live on. That is what we really 
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80 years. The United Kingdom has, on 
a ‘quick sample’ reading, increasing life 
expectancy numbers (‘Life Expectancy 
at Birth’) from 1999 to 2004, for both 
males and females: males go from 74.7 
to 76 years; females from 79.7 to 81 
years.
want. Only if we can continue to live on 
will we have a chance of becoming really 
satisfied. So if we accept death as the end, 
then there can be no real satisfaction now, 
and no real satisfaction later. So we must 
not accept death.
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SCENE XI.
The Body-Bomb
 KATHERINE. Not accept death? Are you crazy? 
But we must die!
2 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, of course we must die, in 
the sense that our physical bodies at some 
point must become lifeless and useless, 
stale and pale. 
3 KATHERINE. But?
4 CHRISTIANUS. But even if we were to accept 
such a future state of affairs for the physi-
cal body, we would certainly not have to 
accept the idea that the individual being 
and his or hers individual consciousness 
must cease to exist.
5 KATHERINE. But didn’t I previously give you 
my argument about what happens when 
the brain dies? Didn’t I explain that the 
individual consciousness also dies, or 
ceases to be, at that time?
6 CHRISTIANUS. You certainly did present your 
theory, and you did it well: it was very 
concise and precise. But I didn’t buy it. 
7 KATHERINE. How can you not buy it?
8 CHRISTIANUS. Because I have a better theory.
9 KATHERINE. How do you mean, ‘better’?
0 CHRISTIANUS. My theory is better simply be-
cause it makes real satisfaction possible, 
while yours doesn’t. 
 KATHERINE. How does it do that? 
2 CHRISTIANUS. I’ll tell you about that in a 
minute. But first I have to ask you a per-
sonal question: do you want to die?
3 KATHERINE. Of course not.
4 CHRISTIANUS. Why not?
5 KATHERINE. Well, there’s only nothingness!
6 CHRISTIANUS. So it’s not that you are afraid 
that the transition between your current 
life and your postulated nothingness-
state is a particularly painful one? 
7 KATHERINE. No, that’s not my worry; the 
transition to nothingness is not painful.
8 CHRISTIANUS. What is your worry, then?
9 KATHERINE. Well, it’s not really a worry; it’s 
just that I have more to do here before 
my body goes!
20 CHRISTIANUS. So you are saying, I guess, that 
there would be little to do in the realm 
of nothingness? Or, at least, that there 
would be little to do that is worth do-
ing?
2 KATHERINE. Very little: nothing! I don’t even 
exist anymore!
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22 CHRISTIANUS. I see.
23 KATHERINE. And I have so much left to expe-
rience here.
24 CHRISTIANUS. Such as?
25 KATHERINE. I still have my mother, and I want 
to spend some more time with her. And I 
also want to continue to paint, and move 
on from acrylics to real oil paint. And 
then, of course, I want to find some very 
nice friends and lovers, so I can be really 
happy.
26 CHRISTIANUS. Sure. So you have a lot of things 
that you care about that you are not es-
pecially eager to give up?
27 KATHERINE. Yes. Except for my weight, of 
course, which I’d give up in an instant.
28 CHRISTIANUS. Naturally.
29 KATHERINE. And there is so little time!
30 CHRISTIANUS. Yes. That is your problem in a 
bombshell.
3 KATHERINE. What do you mean?
32 CHRISTIANUS. Your problem is that you know 
that your personal little bomb is ticking.
33 KATHERINE. My personal little bomb?
34 CHRISTIANUS. Well, it’s not one of those fan-
cy, long-range nuclear devices that James 
Bond usually bumps into. This one has 
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heart beat and is much more close-range. 
But the basic dramatic idea is, of course, 
the same: if X discovers a ticking bomb, 
and X knows that the bomb will blow 
up X if nothing is done, and then X does 
nothing about it, how can X forget the 
bomb?
35 KATHERINE. What do you mean, ‘forget the 
bomb’?
36 CHRISTIANUS. Exactly! He can’t forget it! For 
if he cannot either disarm the bomb or 
remove himself from it, he will, more 
or less, always think about it in one way 
or other. And if he more or less always 
thinks about the bomb, how can he get 
any real satisfaction in terms of anything 
else in his life? 
37 KATHERINE. What if he doesn’t think about 
the bomb?
38 CHRISTIANUS. Remember, the bomb is tick-
ing; and if he cannot disarm it, it will go 
off. 
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x1:34, the basic dramatic idea: Al-
though the word ‘dramatic’ sometimes 
may be used to refer specifically to thea-
tre productions or staged representa-
tions, Christianus probably uses it here 
in a somewhat different sense. Maybe he 
uses it to express some degree of being 
‘[e]motionally intense, as [in] dramatic 
lighting, a dramatic romance’ (Bowman 
and Ball 1961, p. 108; my emphasis); or, 
perhaps, to imply ‘an effect or a com-
bination of effects appropriate to the 
drama or a representation of a drama, 
such as the stirring of the imagination 
and emotions by vivid and expressive 
action, speech, or gesture, or by the ex-
citing complications of a plot’ (Nielson 
1942, p. 274).
39 KATHERINE. But can’t he just walk away from 
it, before it goes off?
40 CHRISTIANUS. It might be possible to do that 
in some situations, with some types of 
bombs; but this little body-bomb is tied 
to his chest, and goes wherever he goes.
4 KATHERINE. But since it’s just a little body-
bomb, maybe it comes only with a very 
small risk?
42 CHRISTIANUS. Does death, in a best-case sce-
nario, only clip a rib or two, and leave 
the rest of the body in a normal, working 
condition?
43 KATHERINE. No.
44 CHRISTIANUS. So regardless of whether it’s a 
small body-bomb or a big one, it’s a body-
bomb. His body will go.
45 KATHERINE. But didn’t you previously men-
tion something about disarming the 
bomb?
46 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, that’s possible in some 
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 WALTER PARKER BOWMAN and ROBERT 
HAMILTON BALL (1961), Theatre Lan-
guage: A Dictionary of Terms in English 
of the Drama and Stage from Medieval to 
Modern Times. New York: Theatre Arts 
Books.
 WILLIAM ALLAN NIELSON, ed. (1942), 
Webster’s Dictionary of Synonyms: A Dic-
tionary of Discriminated Synonyms with 
Antonyms and Analogous and Contrasted 
Words. First edition. Springfield, MA: 
G. & C. Merriam Co., Publishers.
bomb scenarios; but this is a body-bomb 
scenario.
47 KATHERINE. So where does this leave us?
48 CHRISTIANUS. Regardless of which psycho-
physical theory we subscribe to, the 
bomb will go off and kill all your normal 
bodily functions.
49 KATHERINE. So why waste my valuable time 
wondering about whether I should stick 
to my death-and-nothingness theory or 
pick your satisfactionist speculations, if 
I already know that, regardless of which 
theory I end up selecting, my body-bomb 
always is destined to go off?
50 CHRISTIANUS. Well, it’s one thing to think that 
there is a body-bomb going off; it’s an-
other to think that the detonation would 
result in a great loss for the real you.
5 KATHERINE. But if the bomb destroys all my 
normal bodily functions, how can it not 
be a great loss for the real me? I lose my 
mother, my friends, my job, my money, 
my acrylic paintings, my memories, and 
my plans of a perfect two-week Hawaii 
vacation!
52 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, there are many precious 
things to potentially lose in a typical 
death-and-nothingness scenario, includ-
ing consciousness itself. So your scenario 
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is very worrying and dissatisfying on the 
whole. That’s why I think that you might 
be more satisfied with my theory.
53 KATHERINE. How is your theory better?
54 CHRISTIANUS. In my theory I do not accept 
death as the start of any nothingness; 
rather, I see death as an event that leads 
to more life, but perhaps not always ex-
actly as we currently know it. In any case, 
in my afterlife scenario I don’t lose my in-
dividuality or my perception; and I cer-
tainly don’t lose my ability to experience 
things or do things. So in my scenario 
there is much less to worry about and be 
dissatisfied about during my earthly life-
time; and there is, unlike in your theory, 
a possibility to experience satisfaction 
also after death. So my scenario is much 
better than yours.
55 KATHERINE. I am sorry, but it’s a little too 
much for me, at least right now.
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SCENE XII.
The Cartesian Theatre
 CHRISTIANUS. I can certainly relate to that. Ab-
solutely no problem! We can talk about 
those particular details some other time. 
In fact, be sure to remind me about my 
Okefenokee Monster story — it’s reason-
ably short, and easy to understand.
2 KATHERINE. Okee-dokee.
3 CHRISTIANUS. So for now, then, just think of 
my theory as some type of soul-body du-
alism, where the soul is the real living be-
ing who uses the body and the brain as an 
instrument, in order to interact with the 
earthly world.
4 KATHERINE. How do you mean?
5 CHRISTIANUS. In my theory the individual soul 
is the ultimate observer and perceiver of 
everything that is experienced. The indi-
vidual soul uses the organs of the body 
to perceive things in the earthly dimen-
sion. For example, the soul uses the eyes, 
the optic nerve, and parts of the brain to 
process visual information. Similarly, the 
soul uses all of the senses and the brain 
as one big instrument to experience the 
human perspective, the human world.
6 KATHERINE. Well, it’s easy to say it, but why 
would I believe it?
7 CHRISTIANUS. Let’s talk about that. Be patient! 
Now, picture an astronomer who goes 
on a field trip and then, when he tries to 
mount his refractor telescope on his tri-
pod to start his nocturnal observations, 
he accidentally drops it and smashes its 
front lens. Would we then say that the 
astronomer’s own consciousness also stops 
working?
8 KATHERINE. No. But I am sure he’s quite up-
set, especially if the night skies are clear!
9 CHRISTIANUS. Indeed! Or picture a biologist 
who is doing some last-minute research 
with a light microscope. But then her 
instrument suddenly stops working, and 
she doesn’t have a replacement micro-
scope in her lab. Would we then say that 
her general ability to perceive things also 
ceases to be?
0 KATHERINE. No. But I am sure she’s quite ir-
ritated, especially if the deadline for her 
grant goes out the day after and she must 
continue using her light microscope to 
check a few more details for her report. 
 CHRISTIANUS. Certainly! And what would we 
say when a typical office worker’s main 
instrument, the computer, suddenly 
crashes?
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2 KATHERINE. Microsoft Windows?
3 CHRISTIANUS. Well, we might say that, espe-
cially if that was her operating system. 
But another point, and perhaps slightly 
more relevant to the general theme of our 
discussion, would be to say that although 
the computer and its programs crashed, 
the office worker’s consciousness didn’t 
crash, or at least not crash as much.
4 KATHERINE. So, according to your theory, the 
general ability to perceive is not depend-
ent on the brain? Are you saying that the 
general ability to perceive is some non-
material, non-bodily thing or feature?
5 CHRISTIANUS. Something like that, yes.
6 KATHERINE. And how do you explain all the 
brain activity that the neuroscientists 
have proven? 
7 CHRISTIANUS. Well, if you view the brain as 
an instrument through which all percep-
tion goes, then you don’t have to buy all 
those brain-mind identity theories that 
the neuroscientists are trying to sell you.
8 KATHERINE. But don’t they think, just like you 
do, that the brain is instrumental in re-
gards to perception and consciousness?
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x11:21, no single perceiver: Dennett 
(1991, pp. 134–135) says: ‘The natural 
but naïve question to ask is: Where does 
it all come together? The answer is: No-
where.’
 DANIEL C. DENNETT (1991), Con-
9 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, but not in the same way as 
I do. There are, of course, many different 
materialist theories; but many of them 
simply boil down to the idea that there 
is nothing more to you and your personal 
consciousness than the sum total of all 
physical, chemical, and biological func-
tions and interactions in the body. In 
those scenarios there is no soul that is the 
perceiver or observer of the perceptions 
in those scenarios.
20 KATHERINE. So who is the perceiver in those 
soul-less scenarios?
2 CHRISTIANUS. According to Dennett, who is 
one of the main materialist speculators 
in the philosophy of mind, there is ul-
timately no single perceiver; there’s just 
some complex, distributed machine 
processing.
22 KATHERINE. And what about my own obser-
vation that I really feel like I am a single 
being who is perceiving things?
23 CHRISTIANUS. I think Dennett would say that 
your observation certainly is valid on 
some psychological level, and that many 
people are sensing the same thing as you 
75The Cartesian Theatre
sciousness Explained. Illustrated by Paul 
Weiner. Boston, Toronto, and London: 
Little, Brown and Company.
x11:23, many people are sensing: Den-
nett says: ‘But as we shall see, the per-
suasive imagery of the Cartesian Theater 
do.
24 KATHERINE. But?
25 CHRISTIANUS. But he would still claim that 
the feeling of a ‘Cartesian Theatre’ does 
not correspond to how human beings 
are functionally designed. And that your 
feeling of yourself as ‘an entity’ or as a 
‘single person’ who is perceiving things 
from a single point or perspective, is 
nothing but an illusion.
26 KATHERINE. That is hard to believe.
27 CHRISTIANUS. It certainly is.
28 KATHERINE. And how did your explanation 
go, again?
29 CHRISTIANUS. Well, I agree, of course, that 
there is processing going on in the brain-
senses system. But since I regard the 
brain-senses system simply as a complex 
instrument that is being used by the real 
me, my conclusions differ.
30 KATHERINE. What’s the difference?
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keeps coming back to haunt us — lay-
people and scientists alike — even after 
its ghostly dualism has been denounced 
and exorcised’ (1991, p. 107). In regards 
to the second half of Dennett’s state-
ment (‘even after . . . ’), it is not impossi-
ble that Christianus, in his typical style, 
may have replied something like this: 
‘The attempt to denounce X, or the at-
tempt to exorcise X, or both, is no proof 
for that X is wrong. So, for example, 
one may try to denounce and exorcise 
dualism all one wants; it doesn’t prove 
that dualism is wrong. All it proves (if 
it proves anything at all) is that the de-
nouncer and the exorcist wants dualism 
to be wrong.’
x11:25, nothing but an illusion: Den-
nett says: ‘But isn’t there also a real sub-
3 CHRISTIANUS. In my scenario the processing in 
the brain-senses instrument is no proof 
for that my general ability to perceive is 
produced by that brain-senses activity; 
for I am just temporarily using the brain-
senses instrument to view the material 
world.
32 KATHERINE. Can you elaborate?
33 CHRISTIANUS. Well, on my view the processing 
in the brain-senses instrument just indi-
cates that the observer’s ability to perceive 
the earthly world through his brain-senses 
instrument is dependent on the processing 
in his brain-senses instrument. But that 
is a completely natural, predictable and 
non-thrilling consequence of my origi-
nal setup with the individual soul using 
a brain-senses instrument.
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ject, for whose benefit the brain must 
indeed mount a show, filling in all the 
blank spots? This is what Goodman 
seems to be supposing when he talks of 
the brain filling in all the places on the 
path. For whose benefit is all this ani-
mated cartooning being executed? For 
the audience in the Cartesian Theater. 
But since there is no such theater, there is 
no such audience’ (1991, p. 128; empha-
sis in original). Dennett’s idea, then, is 
something like this: ‘What Goodman 
overlooks is the possibility that the brain 
doesn’t actually have to go to the trouble 
of “filling in” anything with “construc-
tion” — for no one is looking’ (1991, 
p. 127).
The Cartesian Theatre
SCENE XIII.
Radha’s Microscope
 KATHERINE. Can you illustrate this with some 
nice example or something?
2 CHRISTIANUS. Let’s see. Have I previously told 
you about Radha?
3 KATHERINE. Radha? I don’t think so.
4 CHRISTIANUS. Radha is a very attractive young 
woman that I know. She is a university-
trained biologist. And she has an electron 
microscope at her lab. 
5 KATHERINE. OK. But why is she so very at-
tractive?
6 CHRISTIANUS. Well, she is just very charming, 
very shapely, and very intelligent. She’s 
definitely a hottie.
7 KATHERINE. OK, OK! I get the picture. Go 
x111:2, Radha: Many Indian parents 
name their children Radha. The classi-
cal Sanskrit pronunciation (and corre-
sponding spelling in Devanagari) of this 
ancient name is raadhaa (with two long 
‘a’ sounds), and originally refers to ‘one 
of the most mysterious figures in all of 
Indian literature’ (Dimock, Jr. 1989, p. 
595). Macdonnell’s entry ‘raadhaa’ lists 
two occurrences of that name in ancient 
Indian literature: ‘f. N. of a cowherdess 
beloved of Krishna and later worshipped 
as a goddess; N. of Karna’s foster-moth-
er’ (1924, p. 254).
 E. C. DIMOCK, JR. (1989), ‘Raadhaa’ in 
Keith Crim, ed., The Perennial Diction-
ary of World Religions. New York, NY: 
Harper & Row. Original edition (1981): 
Abingdon Dictionary of Living Religions. 
Nashville, TN: Abingdon.
 ARTHUR ANTHONY MACDONELL (1924), 
A Practical Sanskrit Dictionary with 
Transliteration, Accentuation, and Ety-
mological Analysis Throughout. London, 
on.
8 CHRISTIANUS. All right. Radha’s perception is 
normal: all her senses are working in an 
orderly fashion. She can hear, see, taste, 
smell, and touch things; and she per-
ceives the ordinary, day-to-day human 
world much like we do.
9 KATHERINE. OK.
0 CHRISTIANUS. But unlike us, she really knows 
how to practically use a transmission 
electron microscope.
 KATHERINE. All right.
2 CHRISTIANUS. Now, if Radha doesn’t turn the 
microscope’s power on, do you think that 
she can perceive any eukaryotic cells, 
with their typical membrane, nucleus, 
and nucleolus?
3 KATHERINE. Well, maybe she has one of those 
colourful cell-structure posters hanging 
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x111:10, electron microscope: Chris-
tianus may here indicate that there is a 
difference between knowing how to use 
an electron microscope and really know-
ing how to use an electron microscope. 
Compare, for example, Rodenberg’s 
statement in regards to users of trans-
mission electron microscopes: ‘there are 
a growing number of users who have 
amazingly little understanding of what 
actually goes on inside an electron col-
umn’ (2004, p. 9).
 JOHN M. RODENBERG (2004), ‘Un-
derstanding Transmission Electron Mi-
croscope Alignment: A Tutorial’ in Mi-
croscopy and Analysis, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 
9–11.
x111:12, eukaryotic cells: Sylvia Mader 
(1990, pp. 61–62) publishes two nice 
transmission electron micrographs of 
eukaryotic cells: one animal cell (mag-
on a wall nearby?
4 CHRISTIANUS. That’s possible. But the ques-
tion I had in mind was more like this: 
Can she perceive any cells through the 
lens system of her electron microscope if the 
microscope’s power is off?
5 KATHERINE. No.
6 CHRISTIANUS. In fact, she will not see any mi-
croscopic objects with her electron mi-
croscope if the power is off, will she?
7 KATHERINE. Probably not.
8 CHRISTIANUS. For unless the power is on, 
there is no image processing in the elec-
tron microscope?
9 KATHERINE. Sounds reasonable.
20 CHRISTIANUS. But yet Radha can see the col-
ourful cell-structure poster hanging on 
the wall, if she looks at the wall?
2 KATHERINE. Yes.
22 CHRISTIANUS. And she can see her well-used, 
pink-coloured coffee machine on the 
bench across the room, if she turns her 
head that way? 
23 KATHERINE. Yes.
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nification: x 15,000) and one plant 
cell (magnification: x 20,000). Purves, 
Orians, Heller, and Sadava (1997, pp. 
72–73) publish several electron micro-
graphs of eukaryotic cells, and also use 
some nice graphics to illustrate the cel-
lular structures of animal cells and plant 
cells.
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24 CHRISTIANUS. By the way: should we order 
some coffee?
25 KATHERINE. Sure! An espresso for me.
26 CHRISTIANUS. OK. And I’ll go for a cappuc-
cino. Waiter!
27 KATHERINE. You were saying?
28 CHRISTIANUS. Well, my point was that Radha’s 
general ability to perceive things in the 
day-to-day human world is not impaired 
when the electron microscope’s power is 
off.
29 KATHERINE. OK.
30 CHRISTIANUS. So what happens with Radha’s 
general ability to perceive things in the 
day-to-day human world when she sud-
denly flips the power switch on?
3 KATHERINE. Assuming that she isn’t elec-
trocuted when she touches the power 
switch?
32 CHRISTIANUS. Of course.
33 KATHERINE. Nothing?
34 CHRISTIANUS. Excellent!
35 KATHERINE. But isn’t something happening 
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 WILLIAM K. PURVES, GORDON H. ORIANS, 
H. CRAIG HELLER, and DAVID SADAVA (1997), 
Life: The Science of Biology. Fourth edi-
tion. Sunderland, MA: Sinauer Associ-
ates, Inc. and Salt Lake City, UT: W. H. 
Freeman and Company.
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when she turns the power on?
36 CHRISTIANUS. Sure, but not with her general 
ability to perceive. 
37 KATHERINE. What, then?
38 CHRISTIANUS. Well, it’s just that the show 
starts. Radha can now perceive scenes of 
microscopic worlds, since there now is 
image processing going on in the electron 
microscope. Previously, when the power 
was off, she didn’t perceive any scenes of 
microscopic worlds, for there wasn’t any 
image processing going on in the elec-
tron microscope. 
39 KATHERINE. And how does this connect to 
your original theory?
40 CHRISTIANUS. Well, my idea is this: it is not 
very surprising that Radha’s perception of 
the microscopic world would disappear 
if she flips the power switch off; for her 
ability to perceive the microscopic world 
through her electron microscope is com-
pletely dependent on the electron micro-
scope’s processing of the images.
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SCENE XIV.
Ontology Drives Explanation
 KATHERINE. Anything else?
2 CHRISTIANUS. Yes. It is important to use a 
correct ontology; that is, a correct view 
of what actually exists, whether it is in 
our ordinary human material world, or 
in some supra-material, supra-human 
world. 
3 KATHERINE. Why is it important?
4 CHRISTIANUS. For ontology drives explana-
tion.
5 KATHERINE. Can you lay it out for me?
6 CHRISTIANUS. Well, when ordinary people 
explain things they commonly use those 
things that they believe exist. For exam-
ple, when you explain to someone why 
you won an important legal case last 
week, you populate your scenario with 
entities that you believe existed at the 
point of the trial; and with those entities 
you build an explanation to show how 
you ended up winning. 
7 KATHERINE. Sure. So I may have populated 
my scenario with a judge, the opposing 
counsellor, myself, the jury, some guards, 
some secretary, etc.?
8 CHRISTIANUS. Exactly. And then you describe 
those characters — including their psy-
chology, their actions, their relations, 
their motives, their background, etc. — 
in such a way as to arrive at the main ef-
fect that you wanted to explain, namely 
that you finally won the case.
9 KATHERINE. Are you saying that this is one 
way to provide an explanation, and that 
there are alternative ways, and perhaps 
even better ways, to do it?
0 CHRISTIANUS. No, that’s not what I am say-
ing. At least not right now. I am simply 
saying that this is what ordinary people 
do all the time: based on what they want 
to explain, and how they want to explain 
it, they populate their little scenarios in 
different ways. 
 KATHERINE. Why is that?
2 CHRISTIANUS. Because they know that they 
can adjust the explanation to suit their 
needs by setting up the ontology in dif-
ferent ways.
3 KATHERINE. But would they always admit that 
they know that, and do that?
4 CHRISTIANUS. Not always.
5 KATHERINE. Can you elaborate?
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6 CHRISTIANUS. Well, one important aspect of 
scenario-construction is that we nor-
mally don’t populate our scenarios with 
entities that we think do not exist, at least 
not when we want to provide an explana-
tion of events that we believe really hap-
pened. So if we, for some reason, think 
that there aren’t any green-coloured cats, 
then we will not put any green-coloured 
cats into any of our explanatory scenarios 
that are geared towards explaining ‘real-
ity’ as it is, or ‘reality’ as it was. 
7 KATHERINE. But we can still talk about green-
coloured cats, can’t we?
8 CHRISTIANUS. Sure! We may put green-col-
oured cats into other scenarios, for other 
purposes than trying to describe ‘real 
facts’ or ‘real events’: we may, for instance, 
use them as part of a joke scenario, or use 
them in a bedtime story scenario; or we 
may put them in some scenario in order 
to try to disprove their existence.
9 KATHERINE. Fair enough. But what’s your 
point, more exactly?
20 CHRISTIANUS. I actually have two points. My 
first point is this. If you populate your 
scenario with the wrong entities, it may 
be very hard to provide a believable ex-
planation. So in our previous example, if 
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you do not populate your scenario with, 
say, a judge, it becomes very difficult to 
explain how you really could have won, 
in a legally binding way.
2 KATHERINE. But why would I not populate 
my scenario with a judge? Many wit-
nesses can testify that the judge really was 
in the room, and that it was ‘business as 
usual’?
22 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, the judge is very hard to 
extricate from your scenario. But this 
is not only because there were so many 
witnesses, but also because it would be 
very hard for this particular explanation 
to make sense without him. For if you 
do not include him, it will be hard to ex-
plain how this alleged courtroom event 
could have occurred in a way as to have 
been legally won by anyone. 
23 KATHERINE. So?
24 CHRISTIANUS. All explanation scenarios are 
not as simple as the public courtroom 
case. There are more difficult scenarios.
25 KATHERINE. Yes. Take for instance some un-
solved murder mystery without witnesses, 
where there is nothing but a dead corpse 
lying around: no blood, no obvious 
weapon, no obvious break-in, no obvi-
ous things stolen, no obvious motive, 
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etc. Who was there? What happened? 
What was the motive?
26 CHRISTIANUS. Sure. But also other scenarios 
may be difficult. Take those, for exam-
ple, where there are some witnesses but 
where different people still do not agree 
about how to populate the explanatory 
scenarios. 
27 KATHERINE. So the problem is then that one 
has many scenarios to deal with, and that 
it is difficult to populate them in such a 
way as to be able to explain the effects or 
phenomena in different, plausible ways?
28 CHRISTIANUS. Sure, that’s part of the problem. 
But plausibility is not the only measure. 
And the fact that one can explain some-
thing in a ‘plausible’ scenario does not 
prove that it is the right explanation. 
29 KATHERINE. I am well aware of that. So what 
is your point?
30 CHRISTIANUS. My second point is this: in order 
to have a chance to really solve the mur-
der case, at least one of your explanatory 
scenarios must be populated with the real 
murderer. If you fail to populate at least 
one of your scenarios with the real mur-
derer, you will never be able to really solve 
the case, no matter how many alternate 
scenarios you have produced.
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3 KATHERINE. But it’s all right, of course, to use 
some alternate scenarios in which the real 
murderer does not have a role? For then 
I may sound more objective and better 
prepared, and be able to produce a more 
convincing courtroom performance.
32 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, that’s a good strategy. So 
you may populate some scenarios in such 
a way that the real murderer is not in 
them. But your ‘select’ scenario as a pros-
ecutor — at least if you want real justice, 
and are unconcerned with issues such as 
your personal safety or future career op-
portunities — must be a scenario that 
you have populated with the real mur-
derer.
33 KATHERINE. Yes, that sounds just about right. 
But so what?
34 CHRISTIANUS. Isn’t that enough? Any scenario 
that doesn’t include the real murderer is 
a wrong scenario, no matter how many 
other details you may get right. So any 
explanation of that dead body that doesn’t 
include the real murderer is a wrong ex-
planation. In other words, an incomplete 
ontology, or an incomplete population of 
your scenario, guarantees a wrong expla-
nation.
35 KATHERINE. All right. That is an excellent 
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point! Perhaps I am just a little tired. We 
have covered so many arguments; and I 
have had a long day.
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SCENE XV.
Another Look at Radha
 CHRISTIANUS. Sure, that’s perfectly under-
standable. Maybe you want a coffee re-
fill?
2 KATHERINE. Yes, but only a small one. I can’t 
stay very much longer.
3 CHRISTIANUS. That’s fine. Waiter!
4 KATHERINE. So what else should we talk 
about?
5 CHRISTIANUS. Well, why don’t we just quick-
ly return to Radha’s lab, just to solidify 
some of my points about scenarios and 
explanation.
6 KATHERINE. All right.
7 CHRISTIANUS. What we might say, then, is that 
it’s good that we have populated our lit-
tle lab scenario in such a way that Radha 
is one individual entity, and the electron 
microscope is another.
8 KATHERINE. Why is that?
9 CHRISTIANUS. Because once we have decided 
what characters and what props we should 
fill our little scenario with, our explana-
tion will almost produce itself. Choosing 
the wrong characters and props not only 
would have guaranteed a wrong explana-
tion, but it may also have made it more 
or less unintelligible and unbelievable.
0 KATHERINE. How?
 CHRISTIANUS. Since we know that Radha 
herself is not a product of some process-
ing going on inside the electron micro-
scope, but an independent person using 
and controlling the electron microscope 
instrument to see some particular micro-
scopic world, it is easy to understand that 
the microscope’s power switch does not 
change Radha’s general ability to perceive 
the world. 
2 KATHERINE. Yes, it is easy.
3 CHRISTIANUS. And it is also easy to see that 
even if the microscope’s power switch is 
irrelevant in regards to Radha’s general 
ability to perceive the day-to-day hu-
man world, it is not irrelevant in regards 
to Radha’s more particular ability to see 
the microscopic world with her advanced 
electron microscope: for if the power is off, 
she can’t see any microscopic world; but 
if the power is on, she can.
4 KATHERINE. Yes, it’s easy: if the power is on, 
then the show is on; if the power is off, 
then the show is off.
5 CHRISTIANUS. Exactly! 
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6 KATHERINE. And once more we assume, of 
course, that she isn’t electrocuted when 
she touches the power switch?
7 CHRISTIANUS. Naturally.
8 KATHERINE. And we also assume, of course, 
that her powering-on doesn’t blow a fuse, 
so that everything becomes dark in the 
room, making her lose even her general 
ability to see things in the room?
9 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, for now.
20 KATHERINE. So what is the overall conclu-
sion?
2 CHRISTIANUS. If one wrongly thinks that Rad-
ha’s general ability to perceive the day-
to-day world around her is produced by 
the processing within the electron micro-
scope, then it becomes very difficult to 
explain how it is that Radha still doesn’t 
lose her general ability to perceive the 
day-to-day world when the microscope’s 
power is off. 
22 KATHERINE. How does this connect to the 
theories of the materialists?
23 CHRISTIANUS. Well, once one has furnished 
one’s scenario with an individual soul 
equipped with a general ability to per-
ceive things in any world, including the 
physical world, one’s explanation doesn’t 
have to be so anti-intuitive on the person-
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al level as the theories of the materialists 
are.
24 KATHERINE. How so?
25 CHRISTIANUS. In my explanation, then, one 
wouldn’t have to try to explain away 
our feeling of ourselves as individuals as 
some sort of illusion; rather, in my theory 
our perception of ourselves as individuals 
is a completely natural one: it naturally 
follows from my original setup where 
each individual soul uses the body as an 
instrument.
26 KATHERINE. So after my body dies, my per-
ception continues? 
27 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, according to my theory.
28 KATHERINE. That is hard to believe.
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SCENE XVI.
Confessions of a Satisfactionist
 CHRISTIANUS. Well, in my early twenties, after 
having been brainwashed a few years at 
my local university, I thought much like 
you do now. My professors were rarely 
interested in preaching anything else 
than their own materialist theories; so 
I was basically indoctrinated to believe 
that there were no real alternatives to 
materialism.
2 KATHERINE. What happened, Chris?
3 CHRISTIANUS. Many things, of course. But the 
more I studied, the more I realized that 
materialism isn’t the only game in town; 
it is perfectly possible to construct very 
coherent world-views without accepting 
many of the core premises of modern 
‘scientific’ materialism.
4 KATHERINE. So what is, in your opinion, un-
satisfactory about the scientific theory 
that I just presented?
5 CHRISTIANUS. The overall problem is that your 
scenario is built on the assumption that 
death is the final frontier. So how can it 
not be unsatisfactory?
6 KATHERINE. Any more specific complaints?
7 CHRISTIANUS. Well, your argument only 
works if one assumes that consciousness 
is directly created by, or is a direct effect 
of, the activity of the physical brain. Your 
theory assumes that consciousness cannot 
be had without the brain.
8 KATHERINE. And why is that unsatisfactory?
9 CHRISTIANUS. It is unsatisfactory to me be-
cause it is built on the unproven premise 
that everything is material. It’s a scenario 
that simply is populated in such a way as 
not to include a soul. But if we really are 
souls who use our bodies as instruments, 
then basically all so-called scientific ex-
planations that have to do with human 
perception and human agency are guar-
anteed to be wrong, on some level or 
other.
0 KATHERINE. But my scenario is not unsatis-
factory to the scientists, is it?
 CHRISTIANUS. You’re right: your scenario is 
not entirely unsatisfactory to them. They 
are interested in trying to sell in theo-
ries that are compatible with the kind of 
mortal and material consciousness that 
is so commonly promoted in the aca-
demic world; for how can they otherwise 
get published, get tenure, and keep their 
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jobs at the universities?
2 KATHERINE. But you suggest that they are still 
unsatisfied?
3 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, at least some of them are.
4 KATHERINE. Why?
5 CHRISTIANUS. Because they are, on some lev-
el or other, also aware of their own lit-
tle body-bombs. So even if they may be 
satisfied in the sense of having managed 
their own academic careers well, they are 
still worried about their incapability to 
handle their own, personal deaths.
6 KATHERINE. Hmmm.
7 CHRISTIANUS. And this is your problem, too. 
Even if you are a very successful lawyer, 
you are more or less miserable. And you 
can’t really be anything else until you 
have faced your own little body-bomb, 
and done something about it. For it will 
blow.
8 KATHERINE. I have to think about that.
9 CHRISTIANUS. Certainly! But be sure to get 
a good night’s sleep first. You must be 
completely exhausted by now, after to-
day’s events!
20 KATHERINE. Yes, I am. But I had a really good 
time here with you! 
2 CHRISTIANUS. I did too! So how long will you 
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be staying before you go back to Flori-
da?
22 KATHERINE. I don’t know. First of all, I really 
have to get some serious rest over here, 
and think some things over. But I also 
have to, as you already know, do some 
serious detective work to try to find my 
absolutely invaluable documents. So I 
am not sure. My guess would be around 
two weeks; but it could be both three 
and four too. It depends. We’ll see.
23 CHRISTIANUS. Sounds good, Katherine!
24 KATHERINE. So what do you think about 
meeting tomorrow? I would love to con-
tinue our little conversation!
25 CHRISTIANUS. Tomorrow? I am sorry, but 
I can’t. I have already booked a lunch 
meeting with a physics professor that I 
know.
26 KATHERINE. But maybe we can meet in the 
evening?
27 CHRISTIANUS. Katherine, I just can’t. You see, 
Tim is a very stubborn and demanding 
professor, and meeting with him is al-
ways very draining; so I expect to have 
zero conversational energy left in the 
evening. But what about Friday?
28 KATHERINE. Sure! Then I can take tomorrow 
off, and get a whole day just to myself, 
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for a change.
29 CHRISTIANUS. Any particular time or place?
30 KATHERINE. Why not outside your favour-
ite café sometime in the morning? You 
always tell me how nice it is in your 
emails!
3 CHRISTIANUS. Sure, that’s definitely doable. 
Would 0 a.m. work for you?
32 KATHERINE. Yes, that would be perfect.
33 CHRISTIANUS. And you have the address?
34 KATHERINE. You bet! I’ve already checked it 
out online!
35 CHRISTIANUS. All right. See you on Friday, 
then!
36 KATHERINE. Great! Take care!
37 CHRISTIANUS. You too!
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